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INDOPCO, INC. v. COMMISSIONER: DETERMINING
THE TAXABLE NATURE OF A TARGET CORPORATION'S
TAKEOVER EXPENSES
INTRODUCTION
Determining whether a business expense should be currently de-
ducted or capitalized is an issue which has continued to divide tax-
payers and the Internal Revenue Service ("I.R.S." or "Service").
Taxpayers want current deductions which reduce their taxable in-
come now, whereas the I.R.S. wants the expense to be capitalized in
order to increase collectable taxes. The proper line between deduc-
tion and capitalization is difficult to draw, even more so when the
result of an expenditure is not a tangible asset or a readily identifi-
able intangible asset.' In INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner,' the Su-
preme Court had the opportunity to draw this line in the context of
expenses incurred by a target corporation during a friendly take-
over.8 The Court held that a corporate target must capitalize the
legal and investment banking fees it incurs during a friendly acqui-
sition." The Court reasoned that such expenditures produce a long-
term benefit to the corporation and are therefore capital in nature.
The Court's assertion of a "long-term benefits" test,6 which it
used to determine that the takeover expenses were capital in nature,
1. Ellis Banking Corp. v. Commissioner, 688 F.2d 1376, 1380 n.7 (1 th Cir. 1982) (noting that
"[t]he proper line between deduction and capitalization, however, becomes much more difficult to
draw when the long-lived benefit achieved as the result of an expenditure is not a tangible asset or
a readily identifiable intangible asset"); see infra notes 22-31 and accompanying text (discussing
the tax treatment of tangible and identifiable intangible assets).
2. 112 S. Ct. 1039 (1992). INDOPCO, Inc. was formerly named National Starch and Chemi-
cal Corporation during both of the lower courts' decisions. The names INDOPCO and National
Starch will therefore be used interchangeably throughout this Note.
3. Id. at 1041-42; see infra notes 174-92 and accompanying text (discussing the facts of the
case).
4. INDOPCO, 112 S. Ct. at 1041-42.
5. Id. (affirming the lower courts' findings that "the transaction produced significant benefits to
National Starch that extended beyond the tax year in question").
6. Id. at 1044-45 (noting that "a taxpayer's realization of benefits beyond the year in which the
expenditure is incurred is undeniably important in determining whether the appropriate tax treat-
ment is immediate deduction or capitalization"). The term "long-term benefits test" is used to
describe this rationale. See infra notes 193-231 and accompanying text (describing the courts'
reliance on long-term benefits as the rationale for capitalizing National Starch's expenditure).
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severely limited the "separate and distinct asset" test it had previ-
ously asserted in 1971 in Commissioner v. Lincoln Savings and
Loan Ass'n.1 No longer is the presence of a separate and distinct
asset a necessary condition for capitalization.8 Rather, the test fo-
cuses on whether an expense creates significant benefits which ex-
tend beyond the tax year in question.9
Adding to the confusion, the I.R.S. has changed its way of deal-
ing with takeover expenses several times since 1985, with the Na-
tional Starch line of cases'0 serving as its catalyst." In a recent
Technical Advice Memorandum ("T.A.M."), 2 the I.R.S. asserted
its latest interpretation of the National Starch cases.'3 Currently,
all expenses incurred during takeovers, whether friendly or hostile,"'
will be capitalized if the expenses produce a long-term benefit to the
target corporation. Not only did the I.R.S. have a difficult time
7. 403 U.S. 345 (1971).
8. INDOPCO, 112 U.S. at 1044 (noting that the presence of a separate and distinct asset may
be a sufficient condition to classification as a capital expenditure, but is not a necessary condition,
and finding that even though INDOPCO's expenditures did not create a separate asset, the ex-
penditures were still capital in nature).
9. Id. at 1045.
10. National Starch & Chem. Corp. v. Commissioner, 93 T.C. 67 (1989), affid 918 F.2d 426
(3d Cir. 1990), affd sub nora. INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 112 S. Ct. 1039 (1992).
11. Tech. Adv. Mem. 85-16-002, 86-26-001, 88-16-005, 89-27-005, 89-45-003, 90-43-003, 90-
43-004, and 91-44-042 illustrate the I.R.S.'s fluctuation on this issue. See infra notes 82-132 and
accompanying text (discussing each T.A.M. and the I.R.S.'s changing views). Even more recently,
Tech. Adv. Mem. 92-40-004 and 93-22-014 have created more room for further criticism of the
I.R.S.'s inconsistencies. See infra notes 133-48 and accompanying text (discussing these rulings).
12. The I.R.S.'s National Office, through the Associate Chief Counsel, issues letter rulings
called Technical Advice Memoranda, whereby advice or guidance about the interpretation and
proper application of tax laws, regulations, and rulings is given in connection with the examination
of a specific taxpayer's return or refund. I GERALD W. PADWE ET AL., OBTAINING IRS PRIVATE
LETTER RULINGS 11-I (1989). Pursuant to I.R.C. § 6110(j)(3), Technical Advice Memoranda
and Private Letter Rulings may not be used or cited as precedent. I.R.C. § 6110(j)(3) (West
1993) ("Unless the Secretary otherwise establishes by regulations, a written determination may
not be used or cited as precedent."). They are, however, useful indications of the Service's position
on a given issue and are frequently consulted by practitioners.
13. Tech. Adv. Mem. 91-44-042 (June 7, 1991).
14. A tender offer is an offer by an acquirer to buy a certain amount or all shares tendered of a
particular company at a particular price, usually above market price. The object is the takeover of
that company. 19 WILLIAM M. FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE COR-
PORATIONS, at Glossary 26 (Perm. ed. 1988) [hereinafter FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA]. A takeover is
defined as a merger, acquisition, or other change in the controlling interest of a corporation. Id. A
friendly. takeover occurs when a corporation indicates an interest in purchasing a majority of stock
in a target corporation and that offer is favorably accepted by the target. Id. § 3.145. A hostile
takeover involves an unfair and coercive'tender offer aimed at controlling a target corporation
which does not want to accept the offer. Id.; see also infra notes 87-90 and accompanying text
(discussing the use of a "white knight" as a defensive tactic by the target of a hostile takeover).
15. Tech. Adv. Mem. 91-44-042 (June 7, 1991) ("The revenue agent must make the factual
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reaching this ultimate conclusion regarding takeover expenses, but
the I.R.S. has since issued other rulings regarding other types of
business expenses which place its policy rationales in question. 16
The taxable nature of takeover expenses will be examined in four
parts. First, this Note examines the definitions of current deductions
and capital expenditures. Part I also explains the tests used for dis-
tinguishing between capital and current expenses prior to the Su-
preme Court's ruling in INDOPCO, the I.R.S.'s treatment of take-
over expenses, the I.R.S.'s treatment of other expenses, and recent
developments which may influence this area of law. Second, this
Note discusses the INDOPCO case itself. Part III focuses on the
Court's opinion in light of the legal background in this area, includ-
ing a critique of the Court's reasoning, a prediction of the possible
I.R.S. interpretations which may result, an argument regarding the
inequitable tax consequences that may occur, and a proposed rule
dealing with takeover expenses specifically. The final part of this
Note discusses the impact of the INDOPCO ruling both practically
and from a policy standpoint. This Note concludes that the Court's
decision failed to provide much-needed, clearly-defined guidelines
for distinguishing current from capital expenditures, especially when
a target corporation's takeover expenses are at issue.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Defining Capitalization and Deductibility
Current deductions and capital expenditures lack a clear distinc-
tion, which explains the problems that the public, the courts, law-
yers, and even the I.R.S. have understanding and differentiating
these terms. In general, Internal Revenue Code ("I.R.C." or
"Code") section 162(a) allows a taxpayer to deduct "all the ordi-
nary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable
year in carrying on any trade or business. Section 162(a) deduc-
determination of whether the target corporation realized a significant long-term benefit as a result
of the expenditure for professional fees.").
16. See infra notes 133-48 and accompanying text (discussing the subsequent T.A.M. rulings).
17. I.R.C. § 162(a) (West 1993). Section 162(a) provides:
(a) There shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary and necessary expenses
paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business,
including-
(1) a reasonable allowance for salaries or other compensation for personal
services actually rendered;
(2) traveling expenses (including amounts expended for meals and lodging
1994] 1167
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tions are matched against current income, and they reduce how
much income will be taxed at the present time. 18 However, under
section 263, no deductions are allowed for "any amount paid out for
...permanent improvements or betterments made to increase the
value of any property . . . . ." Instead, such amounts are capital-
ized, or charged against income the expenditures help earn in the
future, ratably over the useful life of the property. While the Code
provides these guidelines 2 1 the sections must be more fully ex-
plained before they prove useful.
In theory, the key to achieving a more accurate calculation of net
income for tax purposes is to match the revenues received during a
taxable period with the expenses incurred to produce the revenues. 2
other than amounts which are lavish or extravagant under the circum-
stances) while away from home in the pursuit of a trade or business; and
(3) rentals or other payments required to be made as a condition to the con-
tinued use or possession, for purposes of the trade or business, of property to
which the taxpayer has not taken or is not taking title or in which he has no
equity.
Id.
18. See JAMES J. FREELAND ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 355 (7th
ed. 1991) (noting that expenditures made to enable the taxpayer to use the property for that
expected period are immediately deductible).
19. I.R.C. § 263(a) (West 1993). Section 263(a) provides:
(a) No deduction shall be allowed for-
(1) Any amount paid out for new buildings or for permanent improvements
or betterments made to increase the value of any property or estate ...
(2) Any amount expended in restoring property or in making good the ex-
haustion thereof for which an allowance is or has been made.
Id.
20. FREELAND ET AL., supra note 18, at 355; see Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)-l(b) (as amended in
1992) (providing that the amounts paid or incurred to add to the value or substantially prolong
the useful life of plant or equipment, or to adapt property to a new or different use, are included
under § 263(a)). This regulation also provides that "[a]mounts paid or incurred for incidental
repairs and maintenance of property are not capital expenditures. ... Id.
21. The Court apparently resolved the conflict between the two provisions by holding that the
capitalization requirement takes precedence over the deductiblity of ordinary and necessary ex-
penses. Commissioner v. Idaho Power Co., 418 U.S. 1, 17-19 (1974). This Note points out that
§ 162(a) has indeed been construed narrowly and that the capital expenditures enumerated in the
Code are not exhaustive.
22. See Dan L. Goldwasser, Generally Accepted Accounting Principles, in ACCOUNTING FOR
LAWYERS 1990, at 53 (1990) (noting that "under generally accepted accounting principles it
would be inappropriate to recognize the revenues from a given transaction in one acounting period
and to recognize the cost associated with that transaction in another accounting period"). Reve-
nues are defined as "inflows or other enhancements of assets of an entity or settlements of its
liabilities (or a combination of both) from delivering or producing goods, rendering services, or
other activities that constitute the entity's ongoing major or central operations"). Id. at 51. Ex-
penses are defined as "outflows or other using up of assets or incurrences of liabilities (or a combi-
nation of both) from delivering or producing goods, rendering services, or carrying out other activ-
ities that constitute the entity's ongoing major or central operations." Id.
1994] TAKEOVER EXPENSES 1169
However, not all expenditures which occur during a taxable period
give rise to a deduction during that period. If instead an expenditure
gives rise to a benefit which applies to one or more future periods, or
brings about the acquisition of an asset having a useful life2a of
longer than one year, the expenditure has to be capitalized.24 A cap-
ital expenditure is an outlay of capital that results in the acquisition
of property or a permanent improvement in the property's value. 26 If
the capital expenditure results in a tangible asset,26 the capital ex-
penditure is matched with income in the periods it benefits through
depreciation. 27 If the capital outlay results in an intangible asset28
with a determinable useful life, the capital expenditure made to ac-
quire that asset is matched with income in the periods it benefits
23. "Useful life" is defined in the Regulations as follows:
For the purpose of section 167 the estimated useful life of an asset is not necessarily
the useful life inherent in the asset but is the period over which the asset may reason-
ably be expected to be useful to the taxpayer in his trade or business or in the produc-
tion of his income. This period shall be determined by reference to his experience with
similar property taking into account present conditions and probable future
developments.
Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-I(b) (as amended in 1972). Determining the length of a property's useful
life is quite speculative and a subject of disagreement between the I.R.S. and taxpayers. FREE-
LAND ET AL., supra note 18, at 742.
24. See Hotel Kingkade v. Commissioner, 180 F.2d 310, 312 (10th Cir. 1950) (noting that this
rule is commonly known as the "one year" rule of thumb); see also supra notes 19-20 and accom-
panying text (discussing capitalization and the Code section and regulation defining it).
25. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.263(a)-I(a), -2(a) (as amended in 1992); see Illinois Merchants Trust Co.
v. Commissioner, 4 B.T.A. 103, 106 (1929) (noting that a taxpayer must capitalize the cost of
renovations or permanent improvements to property and deduct that expenditure over the useful
life of the property, and contrasting it with a repair made to maintain the property in its ordinary
operating condition which is currently deductible under § 162); see also 5 MERTENS LAW OF
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 25.39 (1989) (hereinafter MERTENS] (noting that amounts paid or
incurred to add to the value or substantially prolong the useful life of property, whether real or
personal, or to adapt property to a new or different use, are capitalized under § 263).
26, Tangible assets include properties such as buildings, equipment, and machinery. See Treas.
Reg. § 1.167(a)-2 (1956) (noting that the depreciation allowance for tangible property applies
only "to that part of the property which is subject to wear and tear, to decay or decline from
natural causes, to exhaustion, and to obsolescence").
27. 5 MERTENS, supra note 25, § 23A.03 (1991). Depreciation is the gradual reduction in value
of property, used in trade or business or held for production of income, not necessarily due to use
or lapse of time. Id. § 23A.122. The taxpayer depreciates the cost over the useful life of the asset.
The end sought by the depreciation allowance is to have the amount of money invested, or the
basis, in a wasting asset returned to the taxpayer as a charge against the income earned by the
asset, and thus avoid the taxing of a return of capital. Id.; see also Treas. Reg. § 1.1012-1(a) (as
amended in 1990) ("In general, the basis of property is the cost thereof. The cost is the amount
paid for such property in cash or other property.").
28. Intangible property does not lend itself to precise definitions. Generally, intangibles enable
the physical assets of the trade or business to produce income. For example, a copyright has no
value apart from the material it covers and is therefore deemed an intangible asset. 5 MERTENS,
supra note 25, § 23A.124.
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through amortization. 9 However, intangible assets, like goodwill
and going concern value,3" in that their useful life cannot be ascer-
tained with reasonable accuracy, are not subject to the allowance
for depreciation.3 1 Money spent on such assets will produce little or
no tax benefit to the taxpayer since the taxpayer cannot recover the
cost over time as with depreciable assets.
Because of the time value of money, money is worth more to the
taxpayer now than if the taxpayer has it at some time in the fu-
ture.32 Therefore, a deduction to reduce current taxable income is
more advantageous than a deduction which will reduce future taxa-
ble income. If expenses incurred by a target corporation during a
takeover, for example legal and investment banking fees which typi-
cally run into the millions of dollars, are treated as capital expendi-
tures, they create an intangible asset. However, the useful life of the
asset cannot be determined.33 Thus, no deductions for depreciation
or amortization would be allowed.3 ' Consequently, the expenditures,
29. Id. Amortization is a depreciation allowance for intangible assets. The intangible asset must
have an ascertainable value separate and distinct from goodwill and going concern value, and have
a limited useful life, the duration of which can be ascertained with reasonable accuracy. Id.
30. Goodwill is the expectancy that old customers will resort to the old place; its essence is the
expectancy of continued patronage. Going concern value is the excess of the purchase price paid
over the fair market value of assets attributable to their existence as an ongoing business. Id.
31. Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-3 (as amended in 1960) ("An intangible asset, the useful life of
which is not limited, is not subject to the allowance for depreciation. No allowance will be permit-
ted merely because, in the unsupported opinion of the taxpayer, the intangible asset has a limited
useful life. No deduction for depreciation is allowable with respect to good will."). Cf. Newark
Morning Ledger Co. v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 1670 (1993) (holding that where a taxpayer is
able to prove that an asset has a limited useful life, the taxpayer may depreciate the asset's value
regardless of how much it resembles goodwill); see infra notes 163-73 and accompanying text
(discussing the Court's finding in Newark Morning Ledger that ascertainable value and useful
life, and not the character of the asset are the keys to obtaining depreciation).
32. In simple terms, "the time value of money is the difference between the value of immedi-
ately available funds and the right to receive funds at sometime in the future." FREELAND ET AL.,
supra note 18, at 611 (quoting Rober G. Woodard, the Acting Tax Legislative Counsel of the
Treasury Department). For example: If the taxpayer keeps $1,000 now and puts it in the bank at
7 percent interest, at the end of one year the $1,000 is worth $1,070. Therefore, $1,000 at the end
of one year is not worth the same as $1,000 today; it is $70 less than what it could be. Of course,
this disparity grows over time. It should become clear that it is more advantageous to immediately
deduct money from current taxable income than it is to receive the same amount of money in the
future through depreciation.
33. Because the "asset" created by the fees paid during the takeover will not wear out, be
consumed, become obsolete, or otherwise eventually become useless, there is no way of determin-
ing how long the asset is useful. See FREELAND ET AL., supra note 18, at 741 (discussing how an
asset's useful life is determined). Whether or not an asset is actually created is also debatable. See
infra notes 216-20 and accompanying text (discussing the INDOPCO Court's rationale that no
separate or distinct asset was created in the case).
34. Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-3 (as amended in 1960).
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if capital in nature, have very little tax value. The only deduction
given would be at the dissolution of the enterprise.35 However, that
possible future deduction is virtually worthless when compared to
the much larger tax benefit received if the expenses are treated as
current deductions.
Despite the fact that they are basic elements of tax law and the-
ory, the distinction between capital expenditures and current deduc-
tions remains difficult. Because of this difficulty, and the compara-
tively greater value of current deductions, taxpayers and the I.R.S.
predictably dispute whether a payment is a deductible expense or a
capital expenditure. As a result, judicial interpretation of I.R.C. sec-
tion 162(a) and subsequent rulings have become the focus for a
resolution.
B. Judicial Interpretation of and Commentary on the Capital!
Deductible Distinction
1. Judicial Interpretation of I.R.C. Section 162
I.R.C. section 162(a) governs the deductibility of an expendi-
ture.36 To qualify for a current deduction from income, five separate
requirements must be satisfied. The expenditure must be: 1) paid or
incurred during the taxable year; 2) for the carrying on of any trade
or business; 3) an expense; 4) necessary; and 5) ordinary.3 7 The Su-
preme Court has provided some useful commentary on, and inter-
pretations of, these requirements.3 8
In determining whether an expense is incurred for the carrying on
of any trade or business, the Court has noted that "the origin and
character of the claim with respect to which an expense was in-
curred, rather than its potential consequences upon the fortunes of
35. INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 112 S. Ct. 1039, 1042 (1992). The amount of money
spent during the takeover would be added to the basis of the enterprise. See supra note 27 and
accompanying text (defining basis). Upon dissolution, if the corporation is sold at a profit, the
increased basis will create a smaller, taxable gain. See I.R.C. § 1001 (West 1993) ("The gain
from the sale or other disposition of property shall be the excess of the amount realized therefrom
over the adjusted basis .... "). This is the point at which the taxpayer will realize her tax bene-
fit, although it will be substantially smaller than a benefit realized through deduction or
depreciation.
36. See supra note 17. and accompanying text (providing the full text of § 162(a)).
37. Commissioner v. Lincoln Say. & Loan Ass'n, 403 U.S. 345, 352 (1971); I.R.C. § 162(a)
(West 1993).
38. However, in a not so useful but oft-quoted statement regarding the distinction between
deductibility and capitalization, Justice Benjamin Cardozo wrote that "life in all its fullness must
supply the answer to the riddle." Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933).
1994] 1171
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the taxpayer, is the controlling basic test of whether the expense was
'business' or 'personal.' ,,a9 This is known as the "origin of the
claim" test for determining the taxable nature of an expenditure,
assuming the other requirements are met, and is discussed later.4 0
"Necessary" expenses are those appropriate and helpful to the de-
velopment of the taxpayer's business."1 Because "appropriate" and
"helpful" are broad and subjective terms, almost any expense in-
curred in a taxpayer's business, from salaries to staples, will be
deemed "necessary."
Historically, the "ordinary" requirement has been the Court's dis-
tinguishing factor between current and capital expenditures.42 "Or-
dinary" does not mean that the payment must be habitual, normal,
or even frequently made; the situation giving rise to the expenditure
may only happen once to a taxpayer, but will be considered "ordi-
nary" if it is not uncommon to the taxpayer's industry.'
Whether an expense is ordinary, and therefore deductible, in com-
puting net income is affected by time, place, and circumstance."
The taxable nature of an expense depends upon the kind of transac-
tion and its normalcy in the particular business in which it was in-
curred. 5 Once an aquisition is made, "the character of the item ac-
39. United States v. Gilmore, 372 U.S. 39, 49 (1963); see infra notes 72-81 and accompanying
text (describing the "origin of the claim" test); see also Woodward v. Commissioner, 397 U.S.
572 (1970) (holding that determining whether litigation expenses must be capitalized turns on
whether the "origin of the claim" litigated was in the process of acquiring a capital asset); Rich-
mond Television Corp. v. United States, 345 F.2d 901, 907 (4th Cir. 1965) (noting that the
phrase "carrying on any trade or business" has been interpreted to mean that only an existing
business, i.e., one that is fully operational, may take advantage of the provision).
40. See infra notes 72-81 and accompanying text (discussing the use of this test).
41. Commissioner v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687, 689 (1966); Commissioner v. Heininger, 320 U.S.
467, 477 (1943); Welch, 290 U.S. at 113. The "necessary" test for deductibility is easy to satisfy
because the definition is broad enough to encompass anything a business deems appropriate and
helpful.
42. Tellier, 383 U.S. at 689-90 ("The principal function of the term 'ordinary' in § 162(a) is
to clarify the distinction, often difficult, between those expenses that are currently deductible and
those that are in the nature of capital expenditures, which, if deductible, must be amortized over
the useful life of the asset.").
43. Welch, 290 U.S. at 114; see also Deputy v. du Pont, 308 U.S. 488, 495-96 (1940) (noting
that "ordinary has the connotation of normal, usual, or customary"); Tech. Adv. Mem. 91-44-042
(June 7, 1991) ("A lawsuit affecting the safety of a business may happen once in a lifetime. The
counsel fees may be so heavy that repetition is unlikely. None the less [sic], the expense is an
ordinary one because we know from experience that payments for such a purpose, whether the
amount is large or small, are the common and accepted means of defense against attack.").
44. DuPont, 308 U.S. at 496 (stating that "what is ordinary, though there must always be a
strain of constancy within it, is none the less [sic] a variable affected by time and place and
circumstance.") (quoting Welch, 290 U.S. at 113-14).
45. Id.
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quired determines the tax treatment of the expenditures made to
acquire it.""6 As a general matter, the Court has observed that costs
incurred to acquire a capital asset are deemed capital expendi-
tures." Judicial interpretation alone, however, does not adequately
solve the characterization problem. Various tests have also been de-
veloped to "aid" in this determination.
2. Judicial Tests for Determining Taxable Nature of Expenses
Despite the foregoing, the Supreme Court and circuit courts alike
have also developed and applied various tests to help determine
whether certain expenses are deductible under section 162, or are
capital in nature under section 263. All courts, however, do appear
to agree on three things: 1) that the determination of whether an
expenditure is ordinary or capital is fact specific;4 8 2) that "an in-
come tax deduction is a matter of legislative grace;"4 and 3) that
the burden of clearly showing the right to a claimed deduction is on
the taxpayer." Overall, courts also agree that I.R.C. section 263 is
not an exhaustive enumeration of nondeductible capital expendi-
tures,5' but that it should serve as a means for distinguishing capital
from current expenses.52 Because the courts view capital expendi-
tures broadly, deductions are therefore strictly construed and al-
lowed only if they are specifically provided for. 3 Consequently, the
46. Central Texas Say. & Loan Ass'n v. United States, 731 F.2d 1181, 1184 (5th Cir. 1984).
47. Woodward v. Commissioner, 397 U.S. 572, 575 (1980) ("It has long been recognized, as a
general matter, that costs incurred in the acquisition . . . of a capital asset are to be treated as
capital expenditures."); see also supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text (defining capital asset).
48. 6 MERTENS, supra note 25, § 25.37 (1992); e.g., DuPont, 308 U.S. at 496 (noting that each
case turns on its special facts); Welch, 290 U.S. at 115 (pointing out that the distinction between
capital expenditure and business expense is made by examining facts of each case); National
Starch & Chem. Corp. v. Commissioner, 918 F.2d 426, 431 (3rd Cir. 1990) (agreeing that the
determination of whether an expenditure is ordinary or capital is fact-specific), affid sub nor.
INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 112 S. Ct. 1039 (1992); Colorado Springs Nat'l Bank v.
United States, 505 F.2d 1185, 1192 (10th Cir. 1974) (noting that in order to determine the taxa-
ble nature of an expense, each case must be individually analyzed); Iowa S. Utils. Co. v. Commis-
sioner, 333 F.2d 382, 385 (8th Cir. 1964) (stating that in distinguishing between capital expendi-
tures and business expenses, each case requires individual investigation and analysis).
49. DuPont. 308 U.S. at 493; New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 435, 440 (1934).
50. INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 112 S. Ct. 1039, 1043 (1992); Interstate Transit Lines
v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 590, 593 (1943); DuPont, 308 U.S. at 493; New Colonial Ice, 292
U.S. at 440.
51. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text (describing § 263(a) and noting that capital
expenditures are defined in the negative).
52. Commissioner v. Idaho Power Co., 418 U.S. 1, 16 (1974); Commissioner v. Lincoln Say. &
Loan Ass'n, 403 U.S. 345, 358 (1971).
53. DuPont, 308 U.S. at 493; New Colonial Ice, 292 U.S. at 440; see also supra text accompa-
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burden of proving that an expense is immediately deductible is
placed on the taxpayer desiring such tax treatment."
In cases prior to 1971, courts looked to the length of time that
benefits from expenditures could be expected to last." In the corpo-
rate context, an expenditure was capital in nature if the expenditure
bettered the corporation for: (1) the duration of its existence; (2)
the indefinite future; or (3) longer than the current taxable year."
Likewise, expenses incurred for the purpose of changing the corpo-
rate structure for the benefit of future operations were not consid-
ered ordinary and necessary business expenses, but were nondeduct-
ible capital expenditures.5
However, in June of 1971, the Court altered this notion. In Com-
missioner v. Lincoln Savings & Loan Ass'n," a state-chartered sav-
ings and loan association sought to deduct an additional insurance
premium which was required by the Federal Savings and Loan In-
surance Corporation ("FSLIC") as part of the bank's annual insur-
ance premium." This extra payment increased the FSLIC's "Sec-
ondary Reserve,"8 0 and federal law provided that an insured
institution could recover this additional premium under certain cir-
cumstances. 1 Lincoln Savings, the taxpayer, argued that this addi-
tional insurance premium was no different from a separate insur-
ance payment that it was allowed to immediately deduct. 2 The
Court, however, concluded that these payments to the Secondary
Reserve were nondeductible capital expenditures." The Court felt it
important and controlling that the payment created or enhanced a
separate and distinct additional asset.8 4 The Court also noted that
nying note 21 (noting the strict construction of current deductions).
54. See supra note 50 and accompanying text (stating that the burden is clearly on the tax-
payer, the one who benefits from § 162 treatment, to prove that an expense is not capital).
55. See, e.g., E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. United States, 432 F.2d 1052, 1059 (3rd Cir.
1970) (noting that when an expenditure resulted in a benefit to the taxpayer "which could be
expected to produce returns for many years in the future," it was deemed capital and
nondeductible).
56. General Bancshares Corp. v. Commissioner, 326 F.2d 712, 715 (8th Cir. 1964).
57. Id.
58. 403 U.S. 345 (1971).
59. Id. at 348.
60. Id. at 349. Each institution had a pro rata share in the Secondary Reserve. Id. at 350.
61. Id. at 350. The circumstances included the termination of the insured's status and the liqui-
dation of the insured institution. Id.
62. Id. at 352-54.
63. Id. at 359.
64. Id. at 354 ("What is important and controlling . . . is that the . . . payment serves to
create or enhance . . . what is essentially a separate and distinct additional asset and that, as an
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"the presence of an ensuing benefit that may have some future as-
pect is not controlling; many expenses concededly deductible have
prospective effect beyond the taxable year."6" The Court seemingly
created a new "separate and distinct asset" test for determining
whether an expenditure should be capitalized, and apparently, every
taxpayer hoped, rejected the test based on a long-term benefits
analysis.
After Lincoln Savings, confusion followed. Some courts followed
Lincoln Savings and applied the "separate and distinct asset" test
for determining whether an expenditure had to be capitalized;66
others, including the Supreme Court, ignored Lincoln Savings and
continued to use a "long-term benefits" type of analysis;67 while
some, namely the Fifth Circuit, combined both analyses.
In Central Texas Savings & Loan Ass'n v. United States,68 the
Fifth Circuit used the Lincoln Savings separate and distinct asset
test to determine if the expenses at issue were ordinary, 9 but also
noted that the period of the benefits "remains a prominent, if not
predominant," characteristic of a capital item.7 0 The court found
that the expenses satisfied the Lincoln Savings test and were there-
fore capital in nature."
An alternative test, not used by the Court in INDOPCO, is the
inevitable consequence, the payment is capital in nature and not an expense, let alone an ordinary
expense, deductible under § 162.").
65. Id. (emphasis added).
66. North Carolina Nat'l Bank Corp. ("NCNB") v. United States, 684 F.2d 285 (4th Cir.
1982) (concluding that expenses incurred in developing branch offices were currently deductible
because such expenditures did not result in the creation of separate assets); Southland Royalty
Co. v. United States, 582 F.2d 604 (Ct. Cl. 1978) (finding that a deduction was allowed for oil
and gas reserve studies since such expenditures did not create a separate property interest, even
though the data presumably provided some long-term benefit to the taxpayer.); Briarcliff Candy
Corp. v. Commisssioner, 475 F.2d 775 (2d Cir. 1973) (concluding that Lincoln Savings required a
separate and distinct asset, identified by a property interest, before expenditures had to be
capitalized).
67. See United States v. Mississippi Chem. Corp., 405 U.S. 298 (1972) (adhering to the rule
that where a security is of value in more than one taxable year, it is a capital asset and the cost is
nondeductible). The taxpayers in this case were required by the Farm Credit Act of 1955 to
purchase a certain amount of stock in a bank in order to obtain a loan from the bank. The
taxpayers sought to deduct such purchase prices as interest paid on a loan since it was required
for the use of the borrowed money. The Court found the stock to be a capital asset. Id. In render-
ing its decision, the Court neither discussed nor explicitly rejected Lincoln Savings. Id. at 310.
68. 731 F.2d 1181 (5th Cir. 1984). In this case, Central Texas Savings sought to deduct several
expenditures, including research fees and attorneys' fees, incurred in investigating and in starting
up new branches of the bank. Id. at 1182.
69. Id. at 1183.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 1185.
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"origin of the claim" test first introduced in United States v. Gil-
more.72 This test has been used to determine whether legal fees in-
curred in particular situations are currently deductible.73 Under the
origin of the claim test, in order to be deductible as ordinary and
necessary business expenses, such expenditures may not have their
origin in the acquisition or disposition of a capital asset.7 4 Further,
if the expenditures do not have their origin in the taxpayer's profit-
seeking activities, the costs may not be deducted. 5
In BHA Enterprises, Inc. v. Commissioner7 6 a radio station in-
curred legal expenses in connection with proceedings by the FCC to
revoke the station's broadcasting license.7 If the FCC had pre-
vailed, the radio station would not have been able to operate its bus-
iness. 78 The Tax Court relied on Madden, Woodward, and Revenue
Ruling 78-38971 in concluding that such litigation arose because of
the taxpayer's business activities and did not result in the acquisi-
tion or disposition of a capital asset.80 Additionally, in determining
that the litigation was directly connected with the radio station's
business activities, the Tax Court emphasized that the station's legal
expenses were deductible because, if the FCC had prevailed, the
taxpayer would have been out of business.8 1
By the time National Starch reached the Tax Court, there was no
clear consensus as to what judicial test the court should apply in
72. 372 U.S. 39 (1963); see supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text (discussing this test as
the method for determining if expenses are business or personal and noting the language used by
the Court).
73. E.g., United States v. Hilton Hotels, 397 U.S. 580 (1970) (using the test to conclude that
expenses incurred to obtain legal and other services in connection with appraisal litigation arose
out of the acquisition of a capital asset and were therefore capital); Woodward v. Commissioner,
397 U.S. 572 (1970) (using the test to find that attorneys' and accountants' fees incurred in
connection with the appraisal of stock litigation were capital); United States v. Gilmore, 372 U.S.
39 (1963) (using the origin of the claim test in determining that legal expenses incurred in de-
fending a divorce suit were capital since the claim against the taxpayer arose out of a personal
relationship); Madden v. Commissioner, 514 F.2d 1149 (9th Cir. 1975) (using the test to find that
litigation expenses that arose, not out of the taxpayer's business, but out of the need of a govern-
ment agency to use the taxpayer's land were capital); BHA Enters., Inc. v. Commissioner, 74 T.C.
593 (1980) (using the test to determine that fees spent by a radio station to defend an action by
the FCC were deductible).
74. Woodward, 397 U.S. at 577-79.
75. Gilmore, 372 U.S. at 48-49; Madden. 514 F.2d at 1151.
76. 74 T.C. 593 (1980).
77. Id. at 597.
78. Id. at 598.
79. Rev. Rul. 78-389, 1978-2 C.B. 126.
80. BHA Enters., 74 T.C. at 601-02.
81. Id. at 602.
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determining whether National Starch's professional expenses in-
curred during a friendly takeover were capital or deductible. Unfor-
tunately, the I.R.S.'s position on such expenses was of little
assistance.
C. The I.R.S.'s Shifting Positions on the Treatment of Takeover
Expenses
If, during the history prior to the Supreme Court's ruling in IN-
DOPCO the courts were "divided" as to what test was appropriate
in determining the taxable nature of certain business expenses, then
the I.R.S. and its position were in absolute turmoil and of little help
before and during the National Starch cases. In 1985, in T.A.M.
85-16-002,2 the I.R.S. outlined its position that expenses incurred
to defend against a stock tender offer were deductible under section
162(a) of the I.R.C. 3 However, the I.R.S.'s Corporate Tax Division
initially took the position that these types of expenses were intended
to protect the market value of the stock and therefore intended to
create long-term benefits."4
Later in 1985, T.A.M. 85-16-002 was withdrawn by T.A.M. 86-
26-001, in which the I.R.S. decided that "greenmail payments"
were capital expenditures, as were attorney or broker's fees incident
to the stock repurchase. 5 But, the I.R.S. changed its mind and rein-
stated T.A.M. 85-16-002, making the takeover expenses deductible
once again.86 This, however, hardly settled the takeover expense
dispute.
82. See supra note 12 and accompanying text (describing T.A.M.s, their purpose, and prece-
dential value).
83. Tech. Adv. Mem. 85-16-002 (Dec. 14, 1984).
84. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,352 (Dec. 31, 1984). The final decision of this memorandum was in
accord with T.A.M. 85-16-002. Id. General Counsel Memoranda ("G.C.M.") are prepared by the
Office of Chief Counsel to the I.R.S. in response to a formal request for legal advice from the
Assistant Commissioner of Internal Revenue. A G.C.M. is used by the Assistant Commissioner to
determine what position the I.R.S. will take on a proposed ruling, private letter ruling, or T.A.M.
P-H Federal Taxes, Internal Memoranda of the IRS, IRS Mem. (P-H) 1 (1982).
85. Tech. Adv. Mem. 85-26-001 (Aug. 23, 1985). "Greenmail payments" are payments by a
target company to a potential acquirer (aka "raider") in exchange for agreements not to pursue
the takeover bid any further. Payment is usually accomplished by buying back the acquired shares
at a premium. 19 FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA, supra note 14, at Glossary 13. In the facts of the
T.A.M., a "standstill" agreement, under which the raider agreed to refrain from further attempts
to acquire the target company for a specified period of time, was also signed. Tech. Adv. Mem.
85-26-001 (Aug. 23, 1985).
86. Tech. Adv. Mem. 88-16-005 (Feb. 13, 1987).
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1. The I.R.S.'s Position Pre-INDOPCO: Expenses Incurred to
Fulfill Fiduciary Duties are Deductible
In 1989, the I.R.S. had occassion to address a different corporate
takeover situation. It considered the taxable nature of expenses re-
lated to resisting a hostile takeover by finding a "white knight." 87 A
hostile takeover involves a tender offer, aimed at acquiring a major-
ity of a corporation's stock and therefore obtaining control of the
corporation. 8 This offer is likely to be unfair and coercive to ex-
isting shareholders. 9 If the target corporation believes that its ac-
quisition by a hostile acquirer would not be in the best interest of its
shareholders, the target corporation may defend itself against the
acquirer's attempt by finding an alternative, acceptable buyer,
termed a "white knight." 9°
In order to decide the issue, the I.R.S. considered these facts: in
1985, an acquirer, A, began a hostile effort to take over a target
corporation, Tcorp, and acquire 51 percent of Tcorp's stock in order
to exercise control over Tcorp.9 1 Believing that such action was not
in the best interest of Tcorp, Tcorp's board of directors directed
management to oppose A's attempt to acquire control of Tcorp 2
Management engaged an investment banker to assist Tcorp in its
defense. 93 The investment banker found an alternative buyer, a
white knight, that would maximize the value received for all of
Tcorp's shareholders' stock, and which had a strategic business plan
which was be similar to that of Tcorp. 94 An agreement was reached
with A to cease its efforts to control Tcorp, and the acquision of
Tcorp by the white knight was approved by Tcorp's shareholders."
In the course of these events, Tcorp incurred expenses related to
the retention of the investment banker and the reimbursement of A
87. Tech. Adv. Mem. 89-27-005 (Mar. 27, 1989); see infra note 90 and accompanying text
(defining a white knight as a takeover defense).
88. 19 FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA, supra note 14, § 3:111.10 (Perm. Ed. Supp. 1992); see supra
note 14 (discussing and defining tender offers and friendly and hostile takeovers).
89. See supra note 14 (defining a hostile takeover).
90. See 19 FLETCHER CLYCLOPEDIA, supra note 14, at Glossary 29 (defining a white knight as
a "[c]ompany sought out by a takeover target in an unfriendly takeover to either acquire control
of the target or otherwise thwart the would-be acquirer"); see also James C. Freund, Merger and
Acquisitions: The Quintessence of Change, 1989-1990 CORP. PRAC. COMM. 475 (discussing corpo-
rate takeovers and the defensive tactics employed by target companies during the 1980s).
91. Tech. Adv. Mem. 89-27-005 (Mar. 27, 1989).
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
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for costs incurred in connection with A's attempt to gain control of
Tcorp."1 Tcorp asserted that the expenditures were incurred to en-
able the board of directors to carry out their fiduciary responsibili-
ties and were currently deductible under I.R.C. section 162(a).9 7
The I.R.S. - called the District Director in these rulings - argued
that the expenditures stemmed from a change in the capital struc-
ture of Tcorp and therefore should have been capitalized as costs of
acquisition to the white knight purchaser.9 8
The Associate Chief Counsel of the National Office decided that
the expenditures were deductible current expenses."9 In applying the
"origin of the claim" test, the expenses were found to be related to
the carrying on of a trade or business since the board had the re-
sponsibility to oppose tender offers which may be detrimental to the
company or its stockholders. 00 The counsel relied on Gilmore and
the origin of the claim test, finding that it was clear that "the ex-
penses at issue arose as a result of the business activites of [TCorp]
that were designed to inform the Directors and protect the share-
holders as well as the future business operations of [TCorp]. The
expenses did not result in the creation of a capital asset." 10 The
board's fiduciary duty was the business activity out of which the
expenditures originated." 2 In T.A.M. 89-27-005, the I.R.S. also
96. Id.
97. Id. Boards of directors have a fiduciary duty to shareholders to determine if any tender
offers are in the best interest of the given company. See Northwest Industries, Inc. v. B.F. Good-
rich Co., 301 F. Supp. 706, 712 (N.D. I11. 1969) (noting that management has the responsibility
to oppose tender offers which it deems detrimental to the company or its stockholders); WILLIAM
E. KNEPPER & DAN A. BAILEY, LIABILITY OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS § 15.02, at
483 (4th ed. 1988) (noting that it has been widely accepted that directors, pursuant to their duty
of care, have an obligation to adequately inform themselves of all material facts prior to any
decision, including takeover proposals).
There are several new fundamental principles which clearly apply to directors who respond to a
takeover proposal:
1) The board of directors must make a thorough, well-documented investigation
before acting;
2) Any defensive measure adopted by the board must be reasonable in relation to the
reasonably perceived threat posed by the takeover bid; and
3) If control of the corporation is to be sold, the board must not interfere with the
open, unrestrained bidding process.
KNEPPER & BAILEY, supra, § 15.01, at 481-82.
98. Tech. Adv. Mem. 89-27-005 (Mar. 27, 1989).
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id; see supra notes 72-81 and accompanying text (discussing the origin of the claim test in
Gilmore).
102. Id.
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found the expenditures to be ordinary and necessary: "'To say that
this course of conduct and the expenses which it involved were ex-
traordinary and unnecessary would be to ignore the ways of conduct
and the forms of speech prevailing in the business world.' "103 In
T.A.M. 89-27-005 the I.R.S. also rejected treating the expenses in
accordance with the general rule that requires capitalization of reor-
ganization expenditures because no changes had occurred to the
capital structure of Tcorp.' 0 "
The Counsel for the National Office concluded that fees paid by a
target corporation to a bank for planning a defensive strategy that
included a friendly takeover by a "white knight," and to a corporate
raider in preventing a proxy fight, were currently deductible. Ex-
penses that the target corporation incurred were deductible because
the target's board of directors fulfilled their fiduciary duties by at-
tempting to insure profitability and protect the shareholders. °10
However, in T.A.M. 89-45-003, the I.R.S.'s National Office re-
voked its ruling in T.A.M. 89-27-005 because it felt its position
seemed more liberal than the Tax Court's position in the recently
decided National Starch case.10 6 The Tax Court had held that in-
vestment banking fees and related expenses incurred by the ac-
quired corporation in a friendly takeover were capital expenditures
because the expenses produced long-term benefits for the corpora-
tion.' 7 The National Office reconsidered and further stated that
"there is no less a long term benefit to the target of a hostile take-
over in the [T.A.M. 89-27-005] situation" than in the friendly take-
over situation of National Starch.'08 The I.R.S. retreated to capital-
izing all takeover expenses but still continued to reassess its rulings.
103. Id. (quoting Commissioner v. Heininger, 320 U.S. 467, 472 (1943)).
104. Id. "The well-established rule in this area is that amounts incurred to effectuate a corpo-
rate 'reorganization' (in the broad sense of a rearrangement resulting in a restructuring of the
corporate entity . . .) are not currently deductible as business expenses. ... BORIS I. BITTKER
& JAMES S. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS 5-33
(5th ed. 1987). Not only would a finding of a reorganization fall under this general rule, but the
acquisition or dispostion of capital assets would also violate the origin of the claim test. See supra
notes 72-81 and accompanying text (discussing this test).
105. Tech. Adv. Mem. 89-27-005 (Mar. 27, 1989); see also Rules on Hostile Takeover Ex-
penses are Tightened, 20 TAX'N FOR LAW. 238 (1992) (discussing T.A.M. 89-27-005).
106. Tech. Adv. Mem. 89-45-003 (Aug. 1, 1989). This T.A.M. was submitted one week after
the Tax Court's decision in National Starch & Chem. Corp. v. Commissioner, 93 T.C. 67 (1989).
107. National Starch & Chem. Corp. v. Commissioner, 93 T.C. 67 (1989); see infra notes 193-
207 and accompanying text (discussing the Tax Court's opinion and rationale).
108. Tech. Adv. Mem. 89-45-003 (Aug. 1, 1989).
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2. The I.R.S.'s Position During INDOPCO: Expenses Incurred to
Resist Hostile Takeovers Are Deductible
In July of 1990, in light of the Tax Court's decision in National
Starch, the I.R.S.'s National Office once again reconsidered
whether expenses incurred to resist a hostile takeover were deducti-
ble. In T.A.M. 90-43-003,109 which was based on the same facts as
T.A.M. 89-27-005,110 the National Office concluded that expenses
which were related to finding a white knight were indeed capital
expenditures and nonamortizable."' The expenses related to em-
ploying the white knight defense "were incurred with the intent to
shift ownership, and did result in the shift of ownership. They were
intended to lead to a benefit that could be expected to produce re-
turns for many years in the future."" 2 However, those expenses
which were directly related to resisting a hostile takeover were de-
ductible as ordinary and necessary business expenses. " The Na-
tional Office once again pointed to the Gilmore "origin of the
claim" test and noted that where litigation expenses arise in order to
protect a business they are deductible ordinary and necessary busi-
ness expenses under section 162.11"4
The National Office ruled, however, that finding a white knight
required more than merely resisting a hostile tender offer. 1 5 Such
action was deemed to be a "permanent solution the components of
which were a friendly acquisition by [the white knight] along with a
standstill agreement that would effectively prohibit [the acquirer]
from making any further attempts to acquire [TCorp] .. .- 6
109. Tech. Adv. Mem. 90-43-003 (July 9, 1990).
110. See supra notes 91-98 and accompanying text (detailing the facts of T.A.M. 89-27-005).
111. Tech. Adv. Mem. 90-43-003 (July 9, 1990).
112. Id.
113. Tech. Adv. Mem. 90-43-003, 90-43-004 (July 9, 1990). In each of these 1990 letter rul-
ings, the National Office allocated the taxpayer's outlay between the costs of having itself ac-
quired by a white knight, which were capital, and the costs of evaluating a tender offer and
resisting it, which were deductible. Id. The National Office continued to rely on McCrory Corp. v.
United States, 651 F.2d 828 (2d Cir. 1981), to support the allocation of costs between deductible
and nondeductible purposes. In McCrory, the court required an allocation of expenditures between
the capital-raising and asset acquisition aspects of two statutory mergers, thereby avoiding the
"dominant aspect doctrine" which creates an all-or-nothing approach. Id.
114. Tech. Adv. Mem. 90-43-003 (July 1, 1990); see supra notes 72-81 and accompanying text
(describing the origin of the claim test). Although the National Office did not mention it here, the
Tax Court relied on the exact same reasoning in BHA Enterprises See supra notes 76-81 and
accompanying text (discussing the decision in BHA Enterprises and the Tax Court's reasoning).
115. Tech. Adv. Mem. 90-43-003 (July 9, 1990).
116. Id.; see supra note 85 (defining a standstill agreement). Because this shift of ownership
was intended to lead to a benefit expected to produce returns in the future, these expenses were
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In allocating the professional expenses, the taxpayer had the bur-
den of establishing which litigation and other expenditures related
to resisting the hostile takeover and were therefore deductible. If the
taxpayer did not present sufficient evidence, all its expenses had to
be capitalized.11 7
3. The I.R.S.'s Present Position on Takeover Expenses: Capitalize
Them All
Approximately one year later, the I.R.S., bolstered by its Na-
tional Starch victory in the Third Circuit Court of Appeals,"'
changed its mind again. In T.A.M. 91-44-042, the National Office
attempted to eliminate the distinction between hostile and friendly
takeovers." 9 This T.A.M. purportedly concerned Coastal Corpora-
tion's ("Coastal") hostile takeover attempt of Houston Natural Gas
("HNG") in 1984.120 To defend itself, HNG engaged investment
bankers, lawyers, accountants, and public relations personnel to ad-
vise its board of directors on all financial matters relating to the
tender offer."' HNG's board of directors ultimately concluded that
it should reject the takeover offer and defend itself against the take-
over attempt. 12 HNG made a counteroffer for Coastal's shares, a
self-tender offer for HNG's shares, and other legal challenges."'
HNG claimed that its directors took these actions to discharge
their fiduciary duty to protect HNG and its shareholders against the
harmful takeover, and that the expenditures were therefore ordinary
and necessary business expenses deductible under section 162(a). 124
This reasoning was consistent with the National Office's previous
position in T.A.M. 89-27-005.121 However, adopting the long-term
benefits reasoning of the Third Circuit in National Starch,12  the
capitalized. Tech. Adv. Mem. 90-43-003 (July 9, 1990).
117. Tech. Adv. Mem. 90-43-003 (July 9, 1990).
118. See infra notes 208-15 and accompanying text (discussing the Third Circuit's decision).
119. Tech. Adv. Mem. 91-44-042 (June 7, 1991).
120. Richard M. Lipton et al., Supreme Court Approves Focus on Long-Term Benefit in Take-
over Expense Controversy, 76 J. TAX'N 324, 328 (1992). For added clarity, Coastal in this
T.A.M. is the same as acquirer A in the previous ones. HNG is TCorp.
121. Id. at 328 n.23.
122. Id.
123. Tech. Adv. Mem. 91-44-042 (June 7, 1991).
124. Id.
125. See supra notes 91-105 and accompanying text (discussing both the rationale used in
T.A.M. 89-27-005 to find that these expenses were deductible, and the fiduciary duty of the board
of directors during takeover attempts).
126. See infra notes 208-15 and accompanying text (discussing the Third Circuit's reasoning).
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National Office ruled that whether a taxpayer may deduct an ex-
pense depends on whether the taxpayer derives a long-term benefit
from the expenditure, and not on whether the takeover is hostile or
friendly.'27 The office stated that the professional fees must be sepa-
rately allocated; only then can an agent make the factual determi-
nation of whether long-term benefits will result.128 Thus, if the ser-
vices performed are in connection with a transaction which results
in a long-term benefit to the target corporation, the expenditures
must be capitalized. 2 In addition to the expenditures incurred to
resist the takeover, the costs incurred by HNG in repurchasing its
stock acquired by Coastal were also nondeductible capital expendi-
tures. °30 The National Office then used the "origin of the claim"
test to assert that the origin was an acquisition of HNG stock, a
capital expenditure, and thus one that failed this test.' 3' However,
in some way qualifying the long-term benefits analysis, the National
Office did acknowledge that there are situations where the Service
has allowed a current deduction for expenses that provide a benefit
beyond the current year, such as advertising costs.'32
In sum, the I.R.S.'s latest position on a target corporation's take-
over expenses is that the presence of a long-term benefit arising
from the expense determines deductibility, regardless of the nature
of the takeover. No clear cut lines are drawn by this position. Even
though the I.R.S. purported to use the long-term benefits test from
the National Starch cases, the National Office continued to make
use of the "origin of the claim" test in analyzing away the directors'
fiduciary duty argument. The interrelation of the two tests is un-
clear from the language of the T.A.M.s. T.A.M. 91-44-042 is the
I.R.S.'s current position regarding the taxable nature of a target
corporation's takeover expenses.
127. Tech. Adv. Mene. 91-44-042 (June 7, 1991).
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. None of the T.A.M.s discuss the practical differences between costs of resisting the
takeover and the costs of employing certain actions which effectuate a successful resistance.
131. Id.; see supra notes 72-81 and accompanying text (discussing this test). The board's fidu-
ciary duty was not considered the origin of the claim but was simply the "purpose" of the repur-
chase. Tech. Adv. Mem. 91-44-043 (June 7, 1991); see also Woodward v. Commissioner, 397
U.S. 572, 577 (1970) (stating that the "primary purpose" test is uncertain and difficult and only
applies to costs incurred in litigation affecting title to property).
132. Tech. Adv. Mem. 91-44-043 (June 7, 1991); Rev. Rul. 68-561, 1968-2 C.B. 117; Rev.
Rul. 56-181, 1956-1 C.B. 96.
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4. Summary of the Treatment of Takeover Expenses
The following is a reference chart of the I.R.S.'s treatment of
takeover expenses since 1989.
TAX TREATMENT OF TARGET CORPORATION'S
TAKEOVER EXPENSES
TYPE OF PRE INDOPCO DURING POST INDOPCO
TAKEOVER LITIGATION
FRIENDLY DEDUCTIBLE CAPITAL CAPITAL
TAKEOVER
HOSTILE DEDUCTIBLE DEDUCTIBLE CAPITAL
TAKEOVER IIII
In order to clearly explain the Service's policy decisions, the I.R.S.'s
treatment of some other expenses is surveyed in the next section.
D. LR.S. Treatment of Other Expenses
In order to evaluate the Service's decisions with regard to take-
over expenses from a policy standpoint, the consideration of the
I.R.S.'s treatment of other expenses will be helpful. Two recent
T.A.M.s will be discussed.
1. T.A.M. 92-40..004
T.A.M. 92-40-004, issued on June 29, 1992, did not deal with the
issue of deductibility of professional fees; rather, the issue was
whether a corporation could deduct the costs it incurred to remove
and replace asbestos insulation in its manufacturing equipment in
response to state and federal requirements regarding asbestos levels
in the workplace.1"' The taxpayer decided to replace the asbestos
insulation instead of continuously monitoring the asbestos levels (the
other regulatory option) because the corporation did not want work
delayed due to violations or employee safety problems. 3 The new
insulation did not save energy or affect operating efficiencies, and
the total cost was minor in relation to the assessed value of the
equipment for property tax purposes.135 However, despite the tax-
payer's argument that the cost should be currently deducted as an
133. Tech. Adv. Mem. 92-40-004 (June 29, 1992).
134. Id.
135. Id.
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incidental repair,' 3 6 the National Office denied the deduction.
The National Office beieved that the costs were more like capital
expenditures because the reduction of human health risks increased
the value of the taxpayer's equipment.'37 The National Office also
noted that the new insulation was permanent, which is inconsistent
with the nature of a repair.' 8 Oddly, the National Office seemed to
indicate that if the taxpayer had only monitored the asbestos level
and took precautions to protect the workers when they performed
equipment maintenance, these costs would have been deductable.' 39
INDOPCO was mentioned in the ruling because, according to the
National Office, the Supreme Court there "provided some guidance
for distinguishing between deductions and capital expenditures."'"40
Under the long-term benefits test of INDOPCO,"' the asbestos re-
. moval costs had to be characterized as captial expenditures. 4 2
2. T.A.M. 93-22-014
In another ruling issued on March 8, 1993, the National Office
considered whether attorneys' fees paid by B, a member of a legisla-
tive body, during an investigation of the legislator's relationship
with a company, were deductible ordinary and necessary business
expenses. 43 B had retained attorneys to advise him of his legal
rights, to assist in the preparation of his testimony, and to counsel
him during the hearings held by the legislative body.'4 4 In determin-
ing the taxable nature of the fees, the Office relied on the "origin of
136. Id. The I.R.S. noted:
Section 1.162-4 of the Income Tax Regulations provides that the cost of incidental
repairs that neither materially add value to the property nor appreciably prolong its
life, but keep it in an ordinarily efficient operating condition, may be deducted as an
expense, provided the cost of acquisition or production or the basis of the property is
not increased by the amount of the expenditures.
Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. "In addition, the taxpayer chose to remove asbestos, in part, to reduce the time and
expense of. . . [taking precautions] to protect its employees each time it performs regular equip-
ment maintenance. By removing asbestos, the taxpayer increase[d] the value of its assets .
Id.
140. Id. (emphasis added).
141. See infra notes 216-31 and accompanying text (discussing the long-term benefits test used
in INDOPCO).
142. Tech. Adv. Mem. 92-40-004 (June 29, 1992) (noting that safer working conditions and
reduced liability are long-term benefits).
143. Tech. Adv. Mem. 93-22-014 (March 8, 1993).
144. Id. B was never disciplined.
1994] 1185
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
the claim" test and Revenue Ruling 74-394.145 In this Revenue Rul-
ing,146 the I.R.S. had used the origin of the claim test to determine
that fees paid by a state judge to attorneys in connection with his
defense of a misconduct charge were deductible ordinary and neces-
sary business expenses since they had their origin in the conduct of
the judge's official duties. 4 7 The National Office followed this ra-
tionale and found that since the "matters investigated and the issues
considered . . . arose out of B's conduct in carrying out the function
of his office[,] . . . the attorney fees paid by [him] in connection
with the investigation are ordinary and necessary business expenses
deductible under section 162(a) . . ,. . While these rulings are
indicative of the I.R.S.'s policy rationales, a discussion of other legal
developments will further develop the impending analysis of IN-
DOPCO and follows in the next section.
E. Recent Developments
Briefly addressing some recent developments in the tax treatment
of takeover expenses and other intangibles will also aid in an analy-
sis of the INDOPCO ruling and its tax consequences. It is undis-
puted that expenses incident to an unsuccessful defense by the tar-
get of a hostile takeover are immediately deductible as
abandonment losses under I.R.C. section 165(a).14 9 The I.R.S. ac-
knowledged this fact in T.A.M. 85-61-002, in which the taxpayer
was permitted to deduct break up fees it incurred when it unsuccess-
fully resisted a takeover attempt. 1 0
In a recent bankruptcy court case, In re Federated Department
Stores, Inc.,"' the I.R.S. tried to deny deductions by two corpora-
tions for break-up fees incurred while unsuccessfully resisting a hos-
145. Id.
146. Rev. Rul. 74-394, 1974-2 C.B. 40.
147. Id.
148. Tech. Adv. Mem. 93-22-014 (March 8, 1993). The National Office, uncharacteristically,
reiterated that this ruling may not be used or cited as precedent. See supra note 12 and accompa-
nying text (noting the precedential value of T.A.M.s).
149. I.R.C. § 165(a) (West 1993) ("There shall be allowed as a deduction any loss sustained
during the taxable year and not compensated for by insurance or otherwise.").
150. Tech. Adv. Mem. 85-16-002 (Dec. 14, 1984); see also Lee A. Sheppard, The INDOPCO
Case and Hostile Defense Expenses, 54 TAX NOTES 1458, 1459 (1992) (noting that the costs of
unsuccessfully defending a hostile takeover are immediately deductible).
151. In re Federated Dept. Stores, Inc., 135 B.R. 950 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1992). Both compa-
nies tried to stave off hostile takeovers by Robert Campeau by entering into merger agreements
with Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. and R.H. Macy & Co., respectively. Once Campeau became the
successful bidder, the mergers fell through. Id. at 953-57.
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tile takeover which resulted in the bankruptcy reorganization of the
companies. The I.R.S. argued that the expenses the target corpora-
tions incurred in resisting the takeover were capital in nature.152
The bankruptcy court, however, determined that the break-up fees
were deductible losses under section 165(a) as costs incurred in con-
nection with the failed mergers (abandoned transactions).153 The
court went on to state that the target corporations engaged in "pro-
tracted and strenuous defensive tactics when faced, involuntarily,
with the threat of [the hostile takeover].""" The court continued
that "the decision to engage in a 'white knight' defense was an es-
tablished, common and accepted defensive move, and thus would be
considered 'ordinary' in the context of a hostile takeover battle.""
The court also found that the expenses incurred to find a white
knight were necessary.' 56 The court concluded that the break-up
fees were also deductible under section 162(a) as ordinary, neces-
sary business expenses. 15 Of note is the court's rejection of Na-
tional Starch as controlling. The court said the case did not apply
because National Starch "dealt with the denial of deductibility of
expenses incurred in a successful friendly takeover."15  With the
benefit of hindsight, the bankruptcy court was able to know that the
failed mergers did not result in a long-term benefit, but rather en-
ded in the antithesis of one - bankruptcy.15 9
Also of note is the recently proposed addition to the Code, section
4501 of House Rule 4210.160 In the form of I.R.C. section 197, the
proposal would allow an amortization deduction with respect to the
capitalized costs of goodwill, going concern value, and certain other
intangible property whose useful life is indeterminable that is ac-
quired by a taxpayer and held in connection with the conduct of a
152. Id. at 958, 961.
153. Id. at 958.
154. Id. at 961.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 962.
159. Id. The court in In re Federated made the obvious factual distinction between this case
and National Starch, which is just the first problem with the Court's subsequent application of the
INDOPCO rationale.
160. H.R. 4210, the "Tax Fairness and Economic Growth Act of 1992," was passed by Con-
gress on March 20, 1992, and vetoed by President Bush. Joint Committee on Taxation, Present
Law and Proposals Relating to the Federal Income Tax Treatment of the Cost of Acquiring
Goodwill and Certain Other Intangibles, 13 Fed. Tax. Rep. (CCH) T 45,925, at 75,821 n.2 (May
6, 1992) [hereinafter Proposals].
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trade or business or any activity engaged in for the production of
income.1 61 The amount of the deduction would be determined by
amortizing the adjusted basis of the intangible asset ratably over
fourteen years.' 62 But if such a code section never becomes a reality,
the Supreme Court last year, in Newark Morning Ledger Co. v.
United States,'63 gave taxpayers the vehicle by which they may be
able to amortize previously unamortizable intangible assets.
In an opinion by Justice Harry Blackmun,"" the Court put to rest
the notion that under I.R.C. section 167,165 an asset that the I.R.S.
considers to be goodwill is never depreciable. Newark Morning
Ledger Co. was a newspaper publisher and successor to the Herald
Company, with which it merged in 1987.166 In 1976, Herald had
purchased all of the outstanding shares of Booth Newspapers, the
publisher of daily newspapers in several parts of Michigan. 67 Her-
ald allocated $67.8 million of its adjusted basis in Booth's shares to
the intangible asset "paid subscribers."' 6 8 This amount was Herald's
estimate of future profits to be derived from these "at-will subscrib-
ers."' 69 Herald claimed depreciation deductions on its federal tax
returns for the $67.8 million allocation. 70 The I.R.S. disallowed the
deductions because the concept of "paid subscribers" was indistin-
guishable from goodwill and therefore not depreciable.17 '
The Court reversed the Third Circuit Court of Appeals and found
that if a taxpayer is able to prove that a particular intangible asset
can be valued and that it has a determinable useful life, the tax-
payer may amortize the asset, regardless of how much it resembles
goodwill. 7 12 The Court stated: "The significant question for purposes
of depreciation is not whether the asset falls 'within the core of the
concept of goodwill,' . but whether the asset is capable of being
161. Id. at 75,821.
162. Id.
163. 113 S. Ct. 1670 (1993).
164. Justice David Souter filed a dissenting opinion, in which Chief Justice William Rehnquist
and Justices Byron White and Antonin Scalia joined.
165. See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text (discussing § 167 and the regulations re-
garding the amortization of intangibles).
166. Newark Morning Ledger, 113 S. Ct. at 1672.
167. Id.
168. Id. There were 460,000 identified subscribers to the Booth newspapers. Id.
169. Id. at 1673.
170. Id.
171. Id.; see supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text (discussing the regulation which speaks
to this notion and defining goodwill).
172. Newark Morning Ledger, 113 S. Ct. at 1680-81.
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valued and whether that value diminishes over time. ' 17 3 The tax im-
plications that proposed section 197 and the Newark Morning
Ledger decision may have for takeover expenses will be discussed in
the Impact section. First, however, the facts, procedural history, and
the Supreme Court's decision in INDOPCO must be considered.
II. SUBJECT OPINION: INDOPCO, INC. V. COMMISSIONER
A. The National Starch/Unilever Transaction
In October of 1977, representatives of Unilever United States,
Inc., expressed interest in acquiring National Starch and Chemical
Corporation, Inc. ("INDOPCO"), a manufacturer of primarily in-
dustrial chemical products and a supplier to Unilever, through a
friendly takeover. 17 4 Unilever intended to proceed with a tender of-
fer only if National Starch's board of directors favored the offer and
if Frank Greenwall, owner of the largest block of outstanding Na-
tional Starch stock, would tender his shares. 78 Greenwall and his
wife Anna, who were then 81- and 79-years-old, respectively, owned
approximately 14.4 percent of the 6,563,000 outstanding common
shares; the balance was publicly held. 76  The tender offer was
designed to comply with the Greenwalls' desire that it be a tax-free
transaction.'" Lawyers representing both sides devised a transaction
that qualified as a tax-free exchange for the Greenwalls under
I.R.C. section 351.178
In November of 1977, Unilever made a formal proposal to Na-
173. Id. at 1681.
174. INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 112 S. Ct. 1039, 1041 (1992). INDOPCO manufac-
tures and sells adhesives, starches, and specialty chemical products. Id.; see also supra note 14
and accompanying text (defining a friendly takeover).
175. National Starch & Chem. Corp. v. Commissioner, 93 T.C. 67 (1989), aff'd, 918 F.2d 426
(3d Cir. 1990), affid sub nora. INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 112 S. Ct. 1039 (1992).
176. INDOPCO, 112 S. Ct. at 1041.
177. Id.
178. Id. Under the agreement, Unilever created two new corporations. One was National
Starch & Chemical Holding ("Holding"), a subsidiary of Unilever, and the other was NSC
Merger, Inc. ("NSC"), a subsidiary of Holding. Id. Pursuant to the tender offer, Holding ex-
changed one share of its nonvoting preferred stock for one share of National Starch common
stock. Id. Holding then merged NSC into National Starch, converting any nontendered National
Starch shares into cash. Id. The exchange qualified under I.R.C. § 351 as a tax-free transfer to a
controlled corporation. Id. A favorable ruling was obtained by National Starch's counsel from the
I.R.S.'s National Office providing that the formation of Holding's subsidiary, NSC Merger, Inc.,
and that the merger of NSC into National Starch would be disregarded for federal tax purposes.
Tech. Adv. Mem. 78-39-060 (June 28, 1978).
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tional Starch's board of directors. 1 9 At that time, National Starch's
counsel advised the directors that they had a fiduciary duty under
Delaware law to ensure that the proposed transaction was fair to the
shareholders. 180 Out of concern that failure to obtain a valuation of
the stock might be evidence of a breach of fiduciary duty, National
Starch then engaged the investment banking firm of Morgan Stan-
ley & Co., Inc., to value the stock, render a fairness opinion, and
assist in the event that there should be a hostile or unsolicited tender
offer.' 8 ' Negotiations resulted in a final offer of $73.50 per share, a
figure Morgan Stanley found to be fair, and the transaction was
consummated in August of 1978.182
A Morgan Stanley report had said that National Starch's man-
agement believed that affiliation with Unilever would create oppor-
tunities for "synergy."' 183 National Starch's 1978 annual report had
said that it would benefit from the availability of Unilever's enor-
mous resources.'84 However, Unilever never made any changes in
the operation of National Starch, nor did it provide any significant
financial or technological assistance. 85 National Starch did not ac-
quire any property or services from Unilever, nor did National
Starch dispose of any of its assets or property. 86 There was no ma-
terial increase in National Starch's sales to the Unilever group. 8"
In return for their services, Morgan Stanley billed National
Starch for fees and expenses in excess of $2.2 million.' 88 Addition-
ally, National Starch was charged approximately $500,000 by its
legal counsel, and incurred other expenses related to the transaction
of approximately $150,000.189
179. INDOPCO, 112 S. Ct. at 1041.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. Approximately 21 percent of National Starch common stock was exchanged for Hold-
ing preferred stock. The remaining 79 percent was exchanged for cash. Id. at 1041 n.2. As a
result of the transaction, Holding acquired all of National Starch's outstanding common stock in
exchange for over $380 million in cash and Holding preferred stock with an aggregate par value
of over $96.5 million. National Starch & Chem. Corp. v. Commissioner, 93 T.C.67, 71 (1989).
183. National Starch & Chem. Corp. v. Commissioner, 93 T.C. 67, 76 (1989), affd, 918 F.2d
426 (3d Cir. 1990), afd. sub nom. INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 112 S. Ct. 1039 (1992).
184. National Starch & Chem. Corp. v. Commissioner, 918 F.2d 426, 432 (3rd Cir. 1990),
affd sub norn. INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 112 S. Ct. 1039 (1992).
185. National Starch, 93 T.C. at 76.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. INDOPCO, 112 S. Ct. at 1042.
189. Id. at 1042. No issue was raised as to the propriety or reasonableness of these charges.
1190 [Vol. 43:1165
TAKEOVER EXPENSES
On its federal income tax return for 1978, National Starch de-
ducted the more than $2.2 million dollars paid to Morgan Stanley
as ordinary and necessary business expenses under section 162(a). 19 °
The I.R.S. disallowed the deduction and issued a deficiency no-
tice. " ' National Starch petitioned the Tax Court, claiming the right
not only to deduct the fees paid to Morgan Stanley, but also to de-
duct its legal and miscellaneous expenses as well.' 92
B. Procedural History
1. The Tax Court Decision
The Tax Court rejected several positions asserted by both Na-
tional Starch and the Commissioner before concluding that Na-
tional Starch's expenses incident to the Unilever takeover were non-
deductible capital expenditures. The court could not find any
evidence to support the Commissioner's assertion that National
Starch's expenditures were nondeductible because they were in-
curred pursuant to a reorganization, whether as a part of a merger,
recapitalization, or stock for stock exchange.' 93 However, the court
still found the expenditures to be capital, based on its belief that
National Starch derived a long-term benefit from its affiliation with
Unilever. 94 The affiliation did not create a separate and distinct as-
set under the test of Lincoln Savings, but rather the affiliation was
"expected to produce returns for many years in the future.' 1 95
The Tax Court specifically rejected National Starch's argument
that Lincoln Savings permitted the deduction of the takeover ex-
penditures because no separate and distinct asset was created. Ac-
cording to the court, since the Supreme Court failed to address the
deductibility of expenditures which did not create or enhance a sep-
190. Id.; see supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text (discussing § 162(a) and providing the
text of the section).
191. INDOPCO, 112 S. Ct. at 1042.
192. Id. On its federal income tax return, National Starch deducted the Morgan Stanley fees
but did not deduct its counsel fees and other expenses. Id. No explanation is provided for this
treatment; however, in its Tax Court petition, National Starch claimed overpayment because the
counsel fees and other expenses had not been deducted. National Starch & Chem. Corp. v. Com-
missioner, 93 T.C. 67, 71 (1989).
193. National Starch, 93 T.C. at 74-75. "We are unwilling to hold, however, that the instant
transaction is sufficiently similar to a reorganization under section 368(a)(1)(B) to cause the ex-
penditures to be capital in nature." Id. at 75.
194. Id. at 75-76.
195. Id. at 75 (citation omitted); see supra notes 58-65 and accompanying text (discussing the
Lincoln Savings test for requiring capitalization).
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arate and distinct asset, Lincoln Savings was inapplicable. 196 In dis-
missing Lincoln Savings, the court relied on authority predating
Lincoln Savings which distinguished current from capital expendi-
tures based on whether the expenditure benefitted the taxpayer for
more than one year.1 97 The court also relied upon General Banc-
shares v. Commissioner'98 for the proposition that expenditures may
be capital in nature even if they do not result in the acquisition or
increase of a corporate asset.' 99 The court also adopted the Fifth
Circuit's position, taken in Central Texas Savings & Loan Ass'n v.
United States,0 that while "the period of the benefits may not be
controlling in all cases, it nonetheless remains a prominent, if not
predominant, characteristic of a capital item." 0'
As support for the court's conclusion that National Starch's ex-
penditures were capital, the Tax Court pointed to three factors: 1)
National Starch's board of directors must have determined that the
takeover by Unilever would result in long-term benefits to National
Starch in approving the acquisition; 202 2) National Starch's 1978
Annual Report indicated that there would be long-term benefits, in-
cluding the opportunity for synergy with Unilever and the future
availability of Unilever's financial and business resources;2 °0 and 3)
that the availability of Unilever's resources was an immediate as
well as long-term benefit to National Starch since it broadened the
corporation's opportunities. 0 The court, however, admitted that
there was no evidence of an immediate benefit from the
affiliation.205
196. National Starch, 93 T.C. at 77 (emphasis added).
197. See E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. United States, 432 F.2d 1052 (3rd Cir. 1970);
Falstaff Beer, Inc. v. Commissioner, 322 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1963); McDonald v. Commissioner,
139 F.2d 400 (3rd Cir. 1943); Clark Thread Co. v. Commissioner, 100 F.2d 257 (3rd Cir. 1938).
198. 326 F.2d 712 (8th Cir. 1964).
199. National Starch, 93 T.C. at 76 (citing General Bancshares, 326 F.2d at 716).
200. 731 F.2d 1181 (5th Cir. 1984): see supra notes 68-71 and accompanying text (discussing
this case).
201. National Starch, 93 T.C. at 76 (quoting the Fifth Circuit's opinion in Central Texas
Savings).
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 76-77; see Thomas F. Quinn, Note, Takeover Expenses Incurred by the Acquired
Corporation - Not Just Another Ordinary Deduction: National Starch & Chemical Corp. v.
Commissioner, 10 J.L. & CoM. 167 (1990). Quinn criticized the Tax Court's conclusion as specu-
lative. "Even if the long-term benefit test is the appropriate inquiry, Judge Clapp's application of
the test relies on speculation rather than on competent evidence supporting the existence of a long-
term benefit." Id. at 179.
205. National Starch, 93 T.C. at 76. However, the court noted that "the lack of benefits in the
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The Tax Court also rejected National Starch's argument that the
expenditures were deductible because they were incurred incident to
its directors' fiduciary duty to its shareholders to determine if the
takeover would be in the shareholders' best interests.206 The court
felt that the dominant aspect of the expenditures was not the fulfill-
ment of the fiduciary duty, but rather the transfer of National
Starch's stock for the benefit of National Starch and its
shareholders. °7
2. The Third Circuit Decision
On appeal, the Third Circuit again rejected the taxpayer's argu-
ment that the absence of a separate asset resulted in deductibility. 0 8
The court did not find a new test announced in Lincoln Savings, nor
did it believe that the Court "intended to create a new standard
applicable irrespective of the factual context." ' 9 Instead, the Third
Circuit found that "no one factor alone can control this complex
decision. 210
According to the court, the "sine qua non of capitalization" is the
presence of a not insignificant future benefit that is more than
merely incidental. 1' Where a transaction produces such a benefit,
the court concluded that a taxpayer must capitalize the expenses
incurred to carry out the transaction. 12
The court then determined that the Tax Court's determination
that both Unilever's enormous resources and the possibility of syn-
ergy arising from the transaction served the long-term betterment of
National Starch was supported by adequate evidence and was not
clearly erroneous.21 " Additionally, the court briefly addressed a pro-
short term does not imply their absence in the long term .... " Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.; see supra note 113 (dicussing the McCrory decision and the dominant aspect test).
208. National Starch & Chem. Corp. v. Commissioner, 918 F.2d 426 (3d Cir. 1990), afid sub
nom. INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 112 S. Ct. 1039 (1992).
209. National Starch, 918 F.2d at 430.
210. Id. ("[W]e find no statutory, regulatory, or decisional test which is dispositive. The issue
[of the treatment of the challenged items] must be determined on the facts presented in the novel
situation before us.") (quoting Colorado Springs National Bank v. United States, 505 F.2d 1185,
1192 (10th Cir. 1974)).
211. Id. at 431. Cf. NCNB Corp. v. United States, 651 F.2d 942, 965 (4th Cir. 1981) (Wid-
ener, J., dissenting) ("Even if the existence of a distinct and recognized property interest may not
be a sine qua non of capitalization, nevertheless I suggest that it is an important factor in deter-
mining whether a separate and distinct asset exists.
212. National Starch, 918 F.2d at 432.
213. Id. at 432-33.
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posal by the Commissioner, but left for another case the "considera-
tion whether the benefits of restructuring ownership alone would be
sufficient to require capitalization of the fees pertinent thereto." '214
Finally, the Third Circuit agreed with the Tax Court that merely
because the expenditures were necessary under Delaware law to ful-
fill the Board members' fiduciary obligation to the shareholders,
their compulsory nature did not make them deductible. 215 Fulfilling
the easily-met "necessary" requirement was not enough to make
them deductible. Accordingly, the expenses incurred by National
Starch were capital in nature.
3. The Supreme Court Decision
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in order to resolve a "per-
ceived conflict" among the Courts of Appeals concerning the appli-
cation of Lincoln Savings: namely, whether the creation of a sepa-
rate and distinct asset is a necessary prerequisite for capitalization
of an expenditure." 6 National Starch maintained its position that,
under Lincoln Savings, the lack of creation of a separate and dis-
tinct asset results in deductibility. The Court believed National
Starch had overread Lincoln Savings and flatly rejected the corpo-
ration's interpretation of the case.2 18 The Court stated that Lincoln
Savings stands for "the simple proposition that a taxpayer's expen-
diture that 'serves to create or enhance . . a separate and distinct'
asset should be capitalized under § 263. It by no means follows,
however, that only expenditures that create or enhance separate and
distinct assets are to be capitalized under § 263."' 19 In short, the
Court found that Lincoln Savings held that the creation of a sepa-
214. Id. at 433.
215. Id. at 434; see also E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. United States, 432 F.2d 1052, 1059
(3rd Cir. 1970) ("[T]he fact that the expenditures were involuntary . . . does not negative a
requirement that they be capitalized, if they were in fact capital expenditures."); Woolrich
Woolen Mills v. United States, 289 F.2d 444, 448 (3rd Cir. 1961) ("The involuntary nature of the
expenditure . . . does not render deductible as expense an item which would otherwise be non-
deductible as capital.").
216. INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 112 S.Ct. 1039, 1042 (1992). The Supreme Court im-
plied that the conflict was between the Third Circuit's decision in National Starch and the Fourth
and Second Circuits' opinions in NCNB v. United States, 684 F.2d 285 (4th Cir. 1982) and
Briarcliff Candy Corp. v. Commissioner, 475 F.2d 775 (2d Cir. 1973). INDOPCO, 112 S. Ct. at
1042 n.3; see also supra note 66 and accompanying text (noting that NCNB and Briarcliff both
followed the separate and distinct asset test of Lincoln Savings).
217. INDOPCO, 112 S. Ct. at 1044.
218. Id.
219. Id. (alterations in original).
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rate and distinct asset may be a sufficient condition for classification
as a capital expenditure, but not a necessary one.220
The Court continued its analysis of Lincoln Savings by noting
that its statement in that case that "the presence of an ensuing ben-
efit that may have some future aspect is not controlling" does not
prohibit reliance on future benefits as a means of distinguishing cur-
rent from capital expenditures. 221 However, the Court did not say
that the existence of a future benefit must always result in capitali-
zation. Instead, the Court noted that "[a]lthough the mere presence
of an incidental future benefit - 'some future aspect' - may not
warrant capitalization, a taxpayer's realization of benefits beyond
the year in which the expenditure is incurred is undeniably impor-
tant in determining whether the appropriate tax treatment is imme-
diate deduction or capitalization. 2 2
Next, the Court examined the specific expenditures incurred by
National Starch. The Court concluded that National Starch did not
demonstrate that the fees it incurred incident to Unilever's acquisi-
tion were deductible. 223 The Court based its decision solely on the
facts, finding ample support for the lower courts' conclusions that
the transaction produced significant benefits to National Starch
which extended beyond the tax year in question.224 The Court
pointed to the availability of Unilever's "enormous resources, espe-
cially in the area of basic technology,"225 and to the possibility of
"synergy" between Naitonal Starch and Unilever given the nature
of Unilever's operations and its strong consumer products orienta-
tion. 26 The Court also believed that in addition to these "antici-
pated resource-related benefits," National Starch obtained benefits
through its transformation from a publicly-held corporation to a pri-
vate one. 27
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 1044-45 (second emphasis added); see Lipton et al., supra note 120, at 326 ("Al-
though the Court's analysis of Lincoln Savings rebutted the oft-cited proposition by optimistic
taxpayers that the absence of a separate asset permits deductibility, it did not answer the more
significant question of whether capitalization always follows the existence of a long term
benefit.").
223. INDOPCO, 112 S. Ct. at 1045.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id. As to this factor, the Court indicated that National Starch acknowledged that it was
subject to significant shareholder relations expenses, including reporting and disclosure require-
ments, proxy battles, and deriavative suits. Id. The Supreme Court also noted that the transac-
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But the Court did not end its analysis with factual findings. It
went on to justify its conclusion on the grounds that "[clourts long
have recognized that expenses such as these, 'incurred for the pur-
pose of changing the corporate structure for the benefit of future
operations are not ordinary and necessary business expenses.' "228
The Court also noted that other courts have characterized expendi-
tures as capital items where the purpose for which they are made
"'has to do with the corporation's operations and betterment, some-
times with a continuing capital asset, for the duration of its exis-
tence or for the indefinite future or for a time somewhat longer than
the current taxable year.' ",229 The Court concluded that this ration-
ale applied equally to the professional charges incurred by
INDOPCO 23 0 and stated that "the acquisition-related expenses
[bore] the indicia of capital expenditures and [were] to be treated
as such."' 3 ' With each court's rationale laid out, an analysis of the
Supreme Court's decision and the I.R.S.'s position based on these
decisions follows.
III. ANALYSIS
INDOPCO presented the Supreme Court with the opportunity to
clearly define capital expenditures. In allowing the opportunity to
slip through its fingers, the Court rendered an opinion that is mostly
confusing and factually distinguishable for the taxpayer litigating a
similar issue. This analysis points out that despite arriving at the
correct result in INDOPCO, the Court did not provide a clear guide-
line for the future. This is made evident by the I.R.S.'s inability to
make up its mind regarding the taxable nature of a target corpora-
tion's takeover expenses. Thus, this analysis takes a look at the
I.R.S.'s fluctuation between the long-term benefits and origin of the
claim tests as applied to friendly and hostile takeovers. Following
this discussion is an examination of the I.R.S.'s continuing policy
inconsistencies. Lastly, a bright line rule is proposed to eliminate the
elusive distinction between capitalization and deductibility, at least
tions allowed National Starch to eliminate previously authorized but unissued shares of preferred
stock and to reduce the number of its authorized common shares from eight million to one thou-
sand. Id.
228. Id. (quoting General Bancshares Corp. v. Commissioner, 326 F.2d 712, 715 (8th Cir.
1964)).
229. Id. at 1046 (quoting General Bancshares, 326 F.2d at 715).
230. Id.
231. Id.
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with regard to takeover expenses.
A. The INDOPCO Decision - Friendly Takeover Expenses
1. The Undefined Long-Term Benefits Test
Instead of setting forth a bright-line test to resolve the question of
proper treatment of expenditures that may produce a benefit in ex-
cess of one year (i.e., "Capitalization always follows the existence of
a long-term benefit"), the Court's opinion in INDOPCO merely in-
dicated that the duration of the benefits derived from an expendi-
ture is a factor, and possibly a controlling factor, in determining
whether an expense is current or capital.2 2 In its conclusion, the
Court stated that the expenditures had the "indicia of capital ex-
penditures" and nothing more s.23  There was no definition of such a
characterization. Future disputes may devolve into listing various
"indicia" relating to an expenditure to determine its taxable na-
ture,234 a possibly lengthy, and definitely ambiguous, process.
On the other hand, INDOPCO may stand for the proposition that
capitalization applies only to those expenditures that produce more
than an "incidental" long-term benefit, although there is no way to
know what that may be from the opinion itself.235 If it were clear
what an "incidental" benefit was, perhaps a corporation could avoid
capitalization of expenditures by denying that such benefits exist.
Despite how wishful, or sneaky, that thinking may be, however, cor-
porations cannot simply leave "incidental" benefits out of their take-
over reports to the shareholders in order to increase the possibility of
deductions. They must include them because of their fiduciary duty
to inform the shareholders of the fairness of the takeover. 3 There-
fore, whether a benefit is incidental and the cost therefore deducti-
ble will be difficult to prove. In light of the Supreme Court's sweep-
232. See supra note 221 and accompanying text (noting the Court's language on this point).
233. INDOPCO. 112 S. Ct. at 1046.
234. Lipton et al., supra note 120, at 326.
235. See INDOPCO, 112 S. Ct. at 1044-45 (noting that the "mere presence of an incidental
future benefit . . . may not warrant capitalization"); see also Lipton et al., supra note 120, at 327
n.14 ("The Court's opinion does not provide any guidance as to the treatment of expenses that
may benefit a corporation for a period substantially less than the existence of the corporation but
longer than one year, i.e., 13-24 months.").
236. See supra note 97 and accompanying text (describing the fiduciary duty of the board of
directors when evaluating a tender offer).
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ing language, it would be difficult for a taxpayer to prove that a
deduction is deserved.237
2. The Decision is Factually Distinguishable
The Court's decision may also be viewed as simply an affirmance
based upon the factual findings of the Tax Court and Third Circuit.
Those courts determined that National Starch reaped significant
long-term benefits from the expenditures incurred incident to the
takeover, even though no separate additional asset was created. 3 8
For example, much of the lower courts' analysis focused on the op-
portunities for synergy resulting from the takeover, and National
Starch's access to Unilever's resources.289 Implicit in this factual
analysis is that the two corporations had an existing relationship and
compatible business operations.240 The Court's approach may be of
little use where such benefits and resulting synergy do not exist. For
example, many corporations engage in takeovers or mergers, not to
make inroads into new product lines or markets by developing their
own products, but to achieve such ends through diversification. If a
corporation merges with an existing business for this purpose, and
that business is wholly unrelated to existing business operations, the
I.R.S. will find it difficult to point to the type of synergy that existed
between National Starch and Unilever and thus will be unable to
justify capitalization on such grounds.24 1 Because the Supreme
Court failed to articulate a bright line rationale, future taxpayers
will have to litigate their takeover cases, or merger cases, on their
unique facts, distinguishing themselves from National Starch and
Unilever. However, no taxpayer is going to know what it has to
show that is so vastly different from "synergy" as to prove that no
long-term benefit exists. This lack of guidance illustrates how unde-
fined the long-term benefits test remains.
237. See supra note 50 and accompanying text (noting that the burden is on the taxpayer to
show that a deduction is allowed).
238. See supra notes 193-215 and accompanying text (noting the rationales of these two
courts).
239. National Starch & Chemical Corp. v. Commissioner, 93 T.C. 67, 76 (1989) (holding that
National Starch's affiliation with Unilever would create opportunities for synergy and access to
resources, despite the lack of any immediate benefit).
240. Prior to the takeover, National Starch was a supplier to Unilever, and continued to sell its
products to Unilever following the takeover. See supra notes 174-92 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing the facts of the case).
241. See Lipton et al., supra note 120, at 329 (noting this example as a way for a taxpayer to
factually distinguish itself from the INDOPCO case).
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3. Misplaced Corporate Structure Analysis
The Court further complicated matters by noting that courts have
long ruled that expenditures for changing corporate structure are
not deductible under I.R.C. section 162.22 However, there was no
change in the corporate structure of National Starch. 243 The cancel-
lation of the authorized preferred stock and the reduction of the
number of outstanding common shares were not the type of transac-
tions that have been considered "corporate structure" changes in the
cases cited by the Court. 44 The INDOPCO case merely involved a
shifting of stock ownership. 45 Even the Third Circuit did not find
favor in the I.R.S.'s argument for capitalization due to changing
National Starch from a publicly-held corporation to a privately-held
one, though the Supreme Court found this to be a long-term benefit
to National Starch. 246 The Court's analysis of INDOPCO as a cor-
porate restructuring was wholly misplaced and tends to decrease the
242. INDOPCO, 112 S. Ct. at 1045.
243. See also supra notes 193, 215 and accompanying text (noting that both the Tax Court
and the Third Circuit Court of Appeals found that no structural change of National Starch took
place).
244. Lipton et al., supra note 120, at 327; see also National Starch & Chem. Corp. v. Com-
missioner, 93 T.C. 67, 75 (1989) (holding that the National Starch transaction was not suffi-
ciently similar to a reorganization under I.R.C. § 368(a)(1) to cause the expenditures to be
capital).
245. For an interesting discussion on the treatment of National Starch's expenses as dividends
to the selling shareholders, see Calvin H. Johnson, The Expenditures Incurred By the Target
Corporation in an Acquisition Reorganization Are Dividends to the Shareholders: (Pssst, Don't
Tell the Supreme Court), 53 TAx NOTES 463 (1991). Johnson believes the expenditures were
neither capital nor current:
They are not corporate investments because they do not give future value nor gener-
ate future taxable income for the corporation. They are plausibly not costs of deferred
gain sales because National Starch . . . did not sell any assets. They are not costs of
improving National Starch's corporate structure or operations because National
Starch corporate structure and operations did not change, What did change was own-
ership. . . . The fees benefitted the shareholders, not the corporation. They are not
even capital expenditures, they are dividends.
Id. at 479.
Another commentator noted in opposition to this view that because the investment banking fees
were incurred solely to fulfill the board of director's fiduciary obligation, the fees are more appro-
priately viewed as costs of doing business, and not dividends. Lipton et al., supra note 120, at 327
n.16. However, the Tax Court in National Starch and the National Office in T.A.M. 91-44-042
(June 7, 1991) both used the "origin of the claim" test to conclude that the fees were not incurred
solely for those reasons but were incurred for the transfer of National Starch's stock and for the
benefit of the shareholders. See supra notes 130-31, 207 and accompanying text (discussing the
National Office's rationale in T.A.M. 91-44-042 and the Tax Court's reasoning in National
Starch).
246. Compare INDOPCO, 112 S. Ct. at 1045 with National Starch & Chem. Corp. v. Com-
missioner, 918 F.2d 426, 433 (3rd Cir. 1990).
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strength of the Court's overall rationale in determining that the pro-
fessional fees produced long-term benefits.
4. No Discussion of the Origin of the Claim Test
In further failing to provide a clear guideline, the Supreme Court
did not use the "origin of the claim" test in any way during its
determination that National Starch's professional expenses were
capital. In fact, the only court during the National Starch litigation
to address a related test was the Tax Court when it decided that the
board of directors' fiduciary duty to the shareholders was not the
"dominant aspect" of incurring the professional fees.247 The Su-
preme Court did not even address the fiduciary duty argument. It
seems unusual that the Court did not use the origin of the claim test
to address this argument when this particular test had been used by
the I.R.S.'s National Office in all of its T.A.M.s regarding takeover
expenses,2 48 and had at least been acknowledged by the Tax Court.
One explanation may be that National Starch only argued that
the Lincoln Savings separate and distinct asset test made the ex-
penditures deductible.24 9 The Supreme Court persuasively dismissed
this hopeful assertion by National Starch.250 Another, more logical
explanation may be that the T.A.M.s dealt with hostile takeovers
and the target corporation's defensive tactics, whereas the Supreme
Court was faced solely with a friendly takeover.2 51 This may mean
that the Supreme Court's rationale is not applicable to hostile take-
overs, although the National Office believes that it does apply.252
The next section considers the Court's rationale as applied to hostile
takeovers and the I.R.S.'s inconsistency as a reaction to the Na-
tional Starch cases.
247. See supra notes 113, 207 and accompanying text (discussing the dominant aspect test and
the Tax Court's view of the argument). '
248. See supra notes 87-132 and accompanying text (discussing the T.A.M.s in detail).
249. See supra notes 194-96 and accompanying text (discussing National Starch's arguments
for deducting the professional fees).
250. See supra notes 218-20 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court's rationale
in rejecting the applicability of Lincoln Savings).
251. See supra notes 174-92 and accompanying text (discussing the National Starch/Unilever
transaction).
252. See supra notes 118-32 and accompanying text (discussing T.A.M. 91-44-042).
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B. The I.R.S.'s Inconsistent Reaction Regarding Hostile
Takeover Defense Expenses
The INDOPCO case dealt with a friendly takeover only. In fact,
none of the courts had occassion to address the situation of a hostile
takeover.25 3 However, in each of the T.A.M.s discussed earlier, the
National Office made decisions regarding takeover expenses in-
curred in resisting a hostile takeover. The discussion of hostile take-
over expenses remains necessary even though very few corporations
and persons have access to the capital needed to attempt a takeover;
the tax years of the merger and acquisition binge of the 1980s are
still open.254
The I.R.S. has addressed the hostile takeover issue several times,
culminating in its position articulated in T.A.M. 91-44-042.215
There are two arguments against capitalizing takeover expenses in-
cident to a hostile takeover. The first follows from the preceding
factual distinction: namely, that the I.R.S. will have difficulty find-
ing synergy among corporations when the target corporation finds
itself in a worse position than before the takeover attempt.256 The
other argument is that a corporation defending against a hostile
takeover is merely trying to defend its business, not create a new
benefit for itself.
The difference in the two arguments is the tests which have been
applied to address them. In the first case, the National Office and
the courts in National Starch have used the long-term benefits test
to make a factual determination in each takeover situation. In the
second case, the National Office and various courts have employed
the origin of the claim test to determine from where the incurred
expenses originated. This section will consider each test with regard
to hostile takeovers.
253. A recent case in front of the Tax Court concerned a target corporation which attempted to
deduct expenses incident to what it felt was a hostile takeover. Victory Markets, Inc. v. Commis-
sioner, 99 T.C. 648 (1992). The court found that because the target corporation's board of direc-
tors did not activate its dividend rights plan and the acquirer did not try to circumvent the direc-
tors by making a tender offer directly to the shareholders, the takeover was a friendly takeover.
Id. at 661-62. The court found INDOPCO applicable but did not address whether
INDOPCO would apply to expenses incurred in a hostile takeover. Id. at 662.
254. See Sheppard, supra note 150, at 1458 (discussing Chevron's successful takeover of Gulf
Oil and the I.R.S.'s asserted tax deficiency against Chevron for its 1984 fiscal year).
255. See supra notes 118-32 and accompanying text (discussing this ruling).
256. See Lipton et al., supra note 120, at 329 ("The many debt laden vicims of the past dec-
ade's merger fever illustrate this."),
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1. Long Term Benefits of Hostile Takeovers
Even though the courts in the National Starch line of cases used
the long-term benefits analysis, none had the opportunity to address
the professional expenses a target corporation incurred during a hos-
tile takeover. The National Office's use of the test in T.A.M.s 90-
43-003 and 91-44-042257 has become the only strong source for ana-
lyzing the test's use in hostile takeover situations.
In T.A.M. 90-43-003, the National Office applied the long-term
benefits test to the portion of the transaction that involved resisting
a hostile takeover by finding a white knight buyer. However, the
National Office noted that because this was a "permanent solution"
and a "friendly acquisition" which had long-term benefits, the costs
associated with finding a white knight had to be capitalized. 58
What is unclear, however, is exactly how Tcorp in the hostile situa-
tion was expected to resist, consequently get deductions, and be suc-
cessful at doing so without finding a white knight buyer or using
some other defensive measure. In response, at least one court, the
bankruptcy court in In re Federated,'5' stated that "the decision to
engage in a 'white knight' defense was an established, common and
accepted defensive move" and found it to be ordinary and necessary
and thus deductible under section 162(a). 260
In T.A.M. 91-44-042,61 the National Office again used the long-
term benefits analysis to capitalize all expenses incurred defending
against a hostile takeover which result in a long-term benefit. 20
Like T.A.M. 90-43-003, no clear-cut lines were drawn by this posi-
tion. Since no distinction between expenses related to finding a
white knight, or utilizing other defense tactics like those of HNG in
T.A.M. 91-44-042,2" and purely resisting a hostile takeover exists,
it appears that based on a long-term benefits analysis that any and
all expenses incurred to resist a hostile takeover will be capitalized.
Because the long-term benefits test is ambiguous to begin with, the
257. See supra notes 109-32 and accompanying text (discussing the T.A.M.s).
258. Tech. Adv. Mem. 90-43-003 (July 9, 1990); see supra notes 115-16 and accompanying
text (noting the National Offices's rationale).
259. In re Federated Dept. Stores, Inc., 135 B.R. 950 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1992).
260. Id. at 961; see supra notes 154-58 and accompanying text (noting the bankruptcy court's
language and rationale).
261. Tech. Adv. Mem. 91-44-042 (June 7, 1991).
262. Id.
263. See supra notes 121-23 and accompanying text (discussing the defensive tactics employed
by HNG).
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future benefits could be very speculative. If the board's decision to
maintain present ownership is a long-term benefit, then expenditures
to maintain that ownership would have to be capitalized as well.
However, as the In re Federated court noted, National Starch did
not address a hostile takeover situation."' The use of the long-term
benefits test in hostile situations by the National Office appears mis-
placed, especially when defensive measures to protect a business are
involved.
2. The Origin of the Claim Test
Because National Starch did not deal with the hostile takeover
situation, the National Office should not have so quickly changed its
mind to employ the long-term benefits test. The "origin of the
claim" test had historically been used to determine whether legal
fees are deductible or not.265 Using this test, the Tax Court in BHA
Enterprises266 found that when litigation expenses arise out of the
taxpayer's business activities, and do not result in the acquisition or
disposition of a capital asset, the expenses are deductible. 67
Obviously, the professional expenses incurred by a target corpora-
tion in resisting a hostile takeover arise out of the corporation's busi-
ness. The National Office agreed when it used the "origin of the
claim" test in T.A.M. 89-27-005268 to determine that because the
board of directors had the duty to oppose detrimental tender offers,
the expenses were related to carrying on a trade or business. 69 The
National Office went on to find the expenditures ordinary and neces-
sary, stating that "'[t]o say that this course of conduct and the ex-
penses which it involved were extraordinary and unnecessary would
be to ignore the ways of conduct and the forms of speech prevailing
in the business world.' "1270 This reasoning is right in line with the
reasoning of the bankruptcy court in In re Federated. The "origin of
the claim" test, when applied to hostile takeover expenses, shows
expenditures to be business expenses. Based on the definitions of or-
264. In re Federated, 135 B.R. 962.
265. See supra notes 72-81 and accompanying text (describing the "origin of the claim" test).
266. BHA Enters., Inc. v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 593 (1980).
267. Id. at 601-02.
268. Tech. Adv. Mem. 89-27-005 (Mar. 27, 1989).
269. Id.; see also supra notes 99-103 and accompanying text (discussing the National Office's
rationale in this T.A.M.).
270. Tech. Adv. Mem. 89-27-005 (Mar. 27, 1989) (quoting Commissioner v. Heininger, 320
U.S. 467, 472 (1943) (alteration in original)).
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dinary and necessary, 71 the expenses should therefore be deductible
under section 162(a) of the Code.
Of course, there is one catch: based on the definition of the "ori-
gin of the claim" test, which states that the expenses cannot result
in the acquisition or disposition of a capital asset,272 any defensive
tactic which has such a result-i.e., the buy back of the target cor-
poration's stock from the acquirer-would fall under this excep-
tion.2 73 Therefore, those costs would have to be capitalized. Other-
wise, all other costs associated with defending a business against a
hostile takeover should be deductible under the "origin of the
claim" test.
3. Policy Rationales
In BHA Enterprises,274 the Tax Court also pointed to a policy
reason for allowing the radio station to deduct the expenses incurred
in defending its business. The court emphasized that the expense of
defense should be deductible because, if the FCC had prevailed, the
taxpayer would have been out of business.27 5 Considering the policy
implications of these decisions regarding takeover expenses is impor-
tant. The Internal Revenue Code has become a tool for Congress in
implementing certain policies and promoting certain behavior. 27 6 It
is therefore not solely a revenue-raising body of legislation. From a
policy standpoint, allowing a target corporation to deduct its defense
expenses is consistent with BHA Enterprises. If the target corpora-
tion is successful, it should be able to deduct the expense under sec-
tion 162(a), since if it had not incurred the costs, it would be out of
business. If the target corporation is unsuccessful, then the costs are
deducted as break-up fees pursuant to section 165.
271. See supra notes 36-47 and accompanying text (discussing judicial interpretation of
§ 162(a)).
272. See supra notes 72-81 and accompaning text (describing and defining the origin of the.
claim test).
273. See supra notes 121-23 and accompanying text (describing HNG's defensive tactics in
T.A.M. 91-44-042).
274. BHA Enters., Inc. v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 593 (1980).
275. Id. at 602; see supra notes 76-81 and accompanying text (discussing the decision in BHA
Enterprises).
276. PHILLIP S. ASHLEY, SELECTED READINGS IN TAX POLICY 1 (1992) ("Congress has come
to use the tax code as a tool to do much more than raise revenue; it is used for such varied things
as furthering social goals such as 'fairness' and redistrubution of wealth to stimulating capital
formation and economic growth.").
277. In re Federated Dept. Stores, Inc., 135 B.R. 950, 958 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1992).
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Addtionally, it would bode well for the I.R.S. to promote more
logical policies. As seen in T.A.M.s 92-40-004 and 93-22-014,278 the
I.R.S. appears to make tax policy decisions which are inconsistent
with social policies promoting positive behavior. Instead of promot-
ing asbestos clean-up and rewarding environmentally sound corpora-
tions with deductions, the National Office, in T.A.M. 92-40-004,
capitalized the taxpayer's expenses.279 However, had the same tax-
payer not removed and replaced the asbestos, it appears that the
I.R.S. would have given the taxpayer current deductions. 80 Then, in
T.A.M. 93-22-014, the National Office allowed a legislator, under
investigation for wrongdoing, to deduct the legal fees associated
with defending himself.28' Whether or not the legislator had been
found guilty would have been of no consequence. He still would
have been allowed to currently deduct the fees.282
These outcomes promote behavior contrary to what should be pro-
moted. Surely, society is more concerned with protecting the envi-
ronment than with subsidizing legislators through deductions. Treat-
ing friendly and hostile takeover expenses in exactly the same
manner ignores the differences in the transactions. Allowing hostile
takeover target corporations to deduct their defense expenses pro-
motes the policy of businesses defending and protecting themselves
when it is in their best interests. Without spending the money, the
business would probably no longer exist. And if that were desirable,
then the takeover would have been friendly, and the expenses would
have been capitalized under the long-term benefits test. Based on
the foregoing legal and social analysis, the following is a proposed
rule which would deal directly with a target corporation's takeover
expenses.
C. Proposed Rule for Treatment of Takeover Expenses
1. Friendly Takeovers
Although the Supreme Court's reasoning in INDOPCO was
flawed in some ways, 283 the long-term benefits test is a historically
278. See supra notes 133-48 and accompanying text (detailing these recent T.A.M.'s).
279. Tech. Adv. Mem. 92-40-004 (June 29, 1992).
280. See supra notes 139-40 and accompanying text (noting the National Office's language).
281. Tech. Adv. Mem. 93-22-014 (Mar. 8, 1993).
282. See supra notes 143-48 and accompanying text (discussing this T.A.M.).
283. See supra notes 232-52 and accompanying text (analyzing the Court's decision and criti-
cizing it on four grounds).
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accepted test and can be appropriately applied to friendly takeover
situations. The outcome in the National Starch cases was correct.
By virtue of the term "friendly" takeover, such a transaction is os-
tensibly desirable and beneficial to the parties involved. Long-term
benefits must exist or the takeover would not be welcomed. Even
though its application remains somewhat ambiguous, if future tax-
payers know that expenses incurred during a friendly takeover are
capital, they will hopefully not look to litigate in court. This would
avoid the listing of various "indicia" of capital expenditures and
would promote consistency for taxpayers.
2. Hostile Takeovers
Because the future benefits of defending against a hostile takeover
are so speculative, 84 the "origin of the claim" test is the better way
to determine the taxable nature of the expenditures. While a corpo-
ration is in the process of defending itself, it is not sure whether it
will be successful. The benefit of hindsight should not determine
whether the expenses are deductible. " 5 In defending against a hos-
tile takeover, the related expenses arise from the board of director's
fiduciary duty and are used to protect and defend a business. The
expenses therefore originate from the taxpayer's business, and as
was noted, are ordinary and necessary. 8 6 The taxpayer is then al-
lowed to deduct these defense costs under section 162(a). 8 The one
exception to this rule will be those costs related to acquiring an as-
set, ie. buying back stock, which would be capitalized under the def-
inition of the "origin of the claim" test. This rule promotes sound
policy and does not give the target corporation a windfall for acquir-
ing a capital asset.
284. Arguably, rather than providing a long-term benefit, the "successful takeover defense sim-
ply maintains the status quo." Sheppard, supra note 150, at 1459.
285. See supra notes 151-59 and accompanying text (discussing the In re Federated decision
and the court's benefit of hindsight in finding no long-term benefits).
286. See supra notes 263-69 and accompanying text (noting that some courts and the National
Office found the defense expenses to be ordinary and necessary in the business).
287. See BHA Enters., Inc. v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 593 (1980) (using the "origin of the
claim" test to determine that fees spent by a radio station to defend against an action by the FCC
were deductible); see also In re Federated Dept. Stores Inc., 135 B.R. 950, 961 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio
1992) ("Costs incurred to defend a business against attack have been considered ordinary and
necessary business expenses, and thus fully deductible under section 162, under a long line of
decisions.") (citations omitted).
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IV. IMPACT
The long-term impact of INDOPCO will mostly depend on what
the courts, the I.R.S., and the taxpayers do with the decision. To
date, no case which has dealt with hostile takeover defense expenses
has been litigated. 88 The problem with one finally coming before a
court is that there is no precedent for the decision except for IN-
DOPCO.28 9 As the analysis has pointed out, INDOPCO really is not
on point for a hostile takeover defense case.29 The long-term bene-
fits test, ambiguous as it is, does provide "some guidance '291  and
sets a precedent for friendly takeover cases, but does not provide a
guideline for all cases in this area.
The I.R.S. has attempted to broaden the INDOPCO rationale and
has applied the long-term benefits test to hostile takeover defense
expenses in T.A.M.s 90-43-003 and 91-44-043.292 The I.R.S. even
argued in In re Federated that bankrupt corporations should have to
capitalize all of their takeover defense expenses. 93 If the long-term
benefits test stands as it does now, and because capitalization is of
such benefit to the I.R.S. with regard to raising revenue, the I.R.S.
may push to have other now deductible expenses capitalized. For
example, advertising costs are currently deductible under section
162.294 If INDOPCO is read broadly, the I.R.S. could justify the
capitalization of any expenditure that results in long-term benefits
to the taxpayer, which advertising costs obviously do.2 95
As it stands now, taxpayers like INDOPCO, or even Tcorp in
T.A.M.s 90-43-003 and 91-44-043, receive virtually no tax benefit
from incurring all of the takeover expenditures. Because the IN-
DOPCO Court, and the lower courts, found that no separate asset
288. See supra note 253 (discussing the Victory Markets case in which the taxpayer argued
that it was the target of a hostile takeover, but the Tax Court found it to be a friendly one).
289. See supra note 12 and accompanying text (discussing the precedential value of Technical
Advice Memoranda).
290. See supra notes 251-53 and accompanying text (analyzing the applicability of INDOPCO
to hostile takeover defense cases).
291. Tech. Adv. Mem. 92-40-004 (June 29, 1992) (emphasis added).
292. See supra notes 109-32 and accompanying text (discussing these T.A.M.s).
293. See supra notes 151-59 and accompanying text (discussing the In re Federated decision).
294. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-1(a); see supra note 132 (noting the Revenue Rulings which have
held that advertising costs are deductible).
295. Much of advertising is directed at building goodwill for the brand or the company rather
than toward the purchase of a specific product. Sheppard, supra note 150, at 1459; see also
Lipton et al., supra note 120, at 327 (noting that the "I.R.S. may ... attack a host of expenses
that traditionally have been deductible, even though such expenses created a benefit extending
beyond one year").
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was created by these expenses,296 the character of the asset that is
created is still undetermined. The Supreme Court noted in IN-
DOPCO that intangible assets without a determinable useful life are
deducted only upon dissolution. " Presumably, the Court thought
that these expenses should be capitalized into an account of their
own, and added to the basis of the corporation. Any tax benefit is
then only realized upon dissolution or liquidation. This "benefit" is
minimal compared to current deductions or depreciation deductions.
Taxpayers could look to proposed section 197, if it or a compara-
ble code section is ever passed, and Newark Morning Ledger for at
least depreciation relief, but it would be futile. Section 197 would
have allowed amortization, over fourteen years, of the capitalized
expenditures; 98 however, the proposed rule would only have applied
to acquired intangibles, reserving self-created intangibles - which
describes takeover expenses - to be governed by current law.2 99
Therefore, the legal and investment banking fees incurred by a tar-
get would not have been amortizable under this rule. 300
The taxpayer's next move in attempting to get depreciation de-
ductions would be to show that the asset to which the expenses were
capitalized has a determinable useful life under Newark Morning
Ledger.301 Realizing that it is difficult to even characterize this as-
set, proving that it has a known useful life would be nearly impossi-
ble. Neither proposed section 197 nor Newark Morning Ledger will
aid the taxpayer in his fight to find beneficial tax consequences
stemming from the expenditures related to either friendly or hostile
takeovers.
The proposed guideline obviously gives a tax benefit to target cor-
porations of hostile takeovers. The problem inherent in this is that if
a merger or takeover is in the best interest of the shareholders, tar-
get corporations may somehow attempt to make the transaction ap-
pear more like a hostile takeover in order to obtain the tax bene-
fit.302 The courts, and the fiduciary duty of the board of directors,
296. See supra notes 193-231 and accompanying text (discussing the opinions of each court in
the National Starch litigation).
297. INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 112 S. Ct. 1039, 1042 (1992); see also supra notes 23-
30 and accompanying text (discussing useful life and intangible assets).
298. See supra notes 160-62 and accompanying text (discussing the proposed House rule).
299. Proposals, supra note 161, at 75,821-22.
300. Sheppard, supra note 150, at 1460.
301. 113 S. Ct. 1670 (1993); see supra notes 163-73 and accompanying text (discussing the
Newark Morning Ledger decision).
302. But see supra note 253 (discussing the Victory Markets decision, in which the Tax Court
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will hopefully safeguard against this downfall of the proposed
guideline.
V. CONCLUSION
Because the Supreme Court in INDOPCO did not clearly define a
guideline for the ambiguous long-term benefits test, taxpayers whose
cases are factually different from INDOPCO have little, if any, help
in determining the taxable nature of their takeover expenses. The
Court did not reveal what results would be deemed long-term bene-
fits to the target corporation, beyond "synergy" and "opportunities."
Taxpayers, who have the burden of proving that their expenses did
not result in long-term benefits, really do not know what will satisfy
that burden. 03 Even though the Court's conclusion in INDOPCO
was correct, its ambiguity and misplaced reasoning are only going to
cause more confusion.
Because capitalization of the professional fees incurred incident to
a takeover has very little tax benefit to the taxpayer, taxpayers and
the I.R.S. are going to continue their battles in this area. The pro-
posed rule may limit the amount of litigation; of course, by virtue of
the fact that taxpayers and the I.R.S. rarely see eye to eye, the war
will continue. The distinction between current deductions and capi-
tal expenditures remains elusive. If the courts are unable to clarify
it, perhaps the only solution will be for legislators to address this
problem.
Melissa D. Ingalls
saw through the taxpayer's characterization of the takeover as hostile, and found it to be friendly).
303. Note that in In re Federated. the I.R.S. had the burden of persuasion despite its argu-
ments to the contrary. In re Federated Dept. Stores, Inc., 135 B.R. 950, 957 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio
1992).
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